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Halbig v. Burwell
Ruling Below: Halbig v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 129023 (D.D.C. 2014).
Individuals and employers in states that had declined to establish health benefit exchanges under
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) brought action challenging Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) rule authorizing tax credits for insurance purchased on both state-run and
federally-facilitated exchanges. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
entered summary judgment in government's favor, and plaintiffs appealed.
Question Presented: Whether the ACA unambiguously restricts the section 36B subsidy to
insurance purchased on Exchanges established by the State as opposed to those established by
the Federal government.

Jacqueline HALBIG, et al., Appellants
v.
Sylvia Mathews BURWELL, In her Official Capacity as U.S. Secretary of Health and
Human Services, et al., Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on July 22, 2014
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge:
Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code,
enacted as part of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA or the Act),
makes tax credits available as a form of
subsidy to individuals who purchase health
insurance through marketplaces—known as
“American Health Benefit Exchanges,” or
“Exchanges” for short—that are “established
by the State under section 1311” of the Act.
On its face, this provision authorizes tax
credits for insurance purchased on an
Exchange established by one of the fifty
states or the District of Columbia. But the
Internal
Revenue
Service
has
interpreted section 36B broadly to authorize
the subsidy also for insurance purchased on

an Exchange established by the federal
government under section 1321 of the Act.
(hereinafter “IRS Rule”).
Appellants are a group of individuals and
employers residing in states that did not
establish Exchanges. For reasons we explain
more fully below, the IRS's interpretation of
section 36B makes them subject to certain
penalties under the ACA that they would
rather not face. Believing that the IRS's
interpretation is inconsistent with section
36B, appellants challenge the regulation
under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), alleging that it is not “in accordance
with law.”
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On cross-motions for summary judgment,
the district court rejected that challenge,
granting the government's motion and
denying appellants'. After resolving several
threshold issues related to its jurisdiction,
the district court held that the ACA's text,
structure, purpose, and legislative history
make “clear that Congress intended to make
premium tax credits available on both staterun and federally-facilitated Exchanges.”
Furthermore, the court held that even if the
ACA were ambiguous, the IRS's regulation
would represent a permissible construction
entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.
Appellants timely appealed the district
court's orders, and we have jurisdiction. Our
review of the orders is de novo, and “[o]n an
independent review of the record, we will
uphold an agency action unless we find it to
be ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.’ ” Because we conclude that the
ACA unambiguously restricts the section
36B subsidy to insurance purchased on
Exchanges “established by the State,” we
reverse the district court and vacate the
IRS's regulation.
I
Congress enacted the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act in 2010 “to increase the
number of Americans covered by health
insurance and decrease the cost of health
care.” The ACA pursues these goals through
a complex network of interconnected
policies focused primarily on helping
individuals who do not receive coverage
through an employer or government

program to purchase affordable insurance
directly. Central to this effort are the
Exchanges. Exchanges are “governmental
agenc[ies] or nonprofit entit[ies]” that serve
as both gatekeepers and gateways to health
insurance coverage. Among their many
functions as gatekeepers, Exchanges
determine which health plans satisfy federal
and state standards, and they operate
websites that allow individuals and
employers to enroll in those that do. Section
1311 of the ACA delegates primary
responsibility for establishing Exchanges to
individual states. However, because
Congress cannot require states to implement
federal laws, if a state refuses or is unable to
set up an Exchange, section 1321 provides
that the federal government, through the
Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS), “shall ... establish and operate such
Exchange within the State.” As of today,
only fourteen states and the District of
Columbia have established Exchanges. The
federal
government
has
established
Exchanges in the remaining thirty-six states,
in some cases with state assistance but in
most cases not.
Under section 36B, Exchanges also serve as
the gateway to the refundable tax credits
through which the ACA subsidizes health
insurance.
Generally
speaking, section
36B authorizes credits for “applicable
taxpayer[s],” defined as those with
household incomes between 100 and 400
percent of the federal poverty line.
But section 36B's formula for calculating the
credit works further limits on who may
receive the subsidy. According to that
formula, the credit is to equal the sum of the
“premium assistance amounts” for each
3

“coverage month.” The “premium assistance
amount” is based on the cost of a “qualified
health plan ... enrolled in through an
Exchange established by the State under
[section] 1311 of the [ACA].” … In other
words, the tax credit is available only to
subsidize the purchase of insurance on an
“Exchange established by the State under
section 1311 of the [ACA].”
But, in a regulation promulgated on May 23,
2012, the IRS interpreted section 36B to
allow credits for insurance purchased on
either a state- or federally-established
Exchange. Specifically, the regulation
provided that a taxpayer may receive a tax
credit if he “is enrolled in one or more
qualified health plans through an
Exchange,” which the IRS defined as “an
Exchange serving the individual market for
qualified individuals ..., regardless of
whether the Exchange is established and
operated by a State (including a regional
Exchange or subsidiary Exchange) or by
HHS. In promulgating this broader rule, the
IRS acknowledged that “[c]ommentators
disagreed on whether the language in section
36B(b)(2)(A) limits the availability of the
premium tax credit only to taxpayers who
enroll in qualified health plans on State
Exchanges,”
but
asserted
without
elaboration that “[t]he statutory language of
section 36B and other provisions of the
[ACA],” as well as “the relevant legislative
history,” supported its view.
This broader interpretation has major
ramifications. By making credits more
widely available, the IRS Rule gives the
individual and employer mandates—key
provisions of the ACA—broader effect than

they would have if credits were limited to
state-established Exchanges. The individual
mandate requires individuals to maintain
“minimum essential coverage” and, in
general, enforces that requirement with a
penalty. The penalty does not apply,
however, to individuals for whom the annual
cost of the cheapest available coverage, less
any tax credits, would exceed eight percent
of their projected household income. By
some estimates, credits will determine on
which side of the eight-percent threshold
millions of individuals fall. Thus, by making
tax credits available in the 36 states with
federal Exchanges, the IRS Rule
significantly increases the number of people
who must purchase health insurance or face
a penalty.
The IRS Rule affects the employer mandate
in a similar way. Like the individual
mandate, the employer mandate uses the
threat of penalties to induce large
employers—defined as those with at least 50
employees—to provide their full-time
employees
with
health
insurance.
Specifically, the ACA penalizes any large
employer who fails to offer its full-time
employees suitable coverage if one or more
of those employees “enroll[s] ... in a
qualified health plan with respect to which
an applicable tax credit ... is allowed or paid
with respect to the employee.” Thus, even
more than with the individual mandate, the
employer mandate's penalties hinge on the
availability of credits. If credits were
unavailable in states with federal Exchanges,
employers there would face no penalties for
failing to offer coverage. The IRS Rule has
the opposite effect: by allowing credits in
such states, it exposes employers there to
4

penalties and thereby gives the employer
mandate broader reach.
II
Before we can turn to the merits of the
parties' dispute, we must first address the
government's argument that all appellants
lack standing and that, even if they have
standing, the APA does not provide them
with a cause of action to challenge the IRS
Rule. Because we find that appellant David
Klemencic has standing and a cause of
action under the APA, we do not reach the
issue of our jurisdiction over the remaining
appellants' claims.
A
The “ ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’
“ a plaintiff must show to establish standing
is (1) an injury in fact (2) fairly traceable to
the alleged conduct of the defendant (3) that
is likely to be redressed by the relief the
plaintiff seeks.” The district court
determined that at least one of the
appellants, David Klemencic, has standing.
Klemencic resides in West Virginia, a state
that did not establish its own Exchange, and
expects to earn approximately $20,000 this
year. He avers that he does not wish to
purchase health insurance and that, but for
federal credits, he would be exempt from the
individual
mandate
because
the
unsubsidized cost of coverage would exceed
eight percent of his income. The availability
of credits on West Virginia's federal
Exchange therefore confronts Klemencic
with a choice he'd rather avoid: purchase
health insurance at a subsidized cost of less
than $21 per year or pay a somewhat greater
tax penalty.

The government primarily questions
whether Klemencic has suffered an injury in
fact… The government characterizes
Klemencic's injury as purely ideological and
hence neither concrete nor particularized.
But, although Klemencic admits to being at
least partly motivated by opposition to
“government handouts,” he has established
that, by making subsidies available in West
Virginia, the IRS Rule will have quantifiable
economic consequences particular to him.
Those consequences may be small, but even
an “ ‘identifiable trifle’ “ of harm may
establish standing. Klemencic thus satisfies
the requirement of establishing an injury in
fact, and because that injury is traceable to
the IRS Rule and redressable through a
judicial decision invalidating the rule, we
find that he has standing to challenge the
rule. We therefore proceed to consider
whether Klemencic may mount his
challenge under the APA.
B
The APA provides a cause of action to
challenge final agency action “for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a
court.” The government argues that even if
Klemencic has standing to challenge the IRS
Rule, he cannot do so under the APA
because he has an adequate alternative
remedy in the form of a tax-refund suit:
Klemencic could violate the individual
mandate, pay the penalty, and then sue for a
refund, raising the same arguments he
makes here. Such a remedy is adequate, the
government contends, because if Klemencic
were successful, the suit would make him
financially whole.
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The APA “embodies the basic presumption
of judicial review” of agency action.
Therefore, in determining whether an
alternative remedy is adequate, we must
give the APA's “generous review
provisions” a “hospitable interpretation,”
such that “only upon a showing of clear and
convincing evidence of a contrary legislative
intent should the courts restrict access to
judicial review.” Under this standard, “[a]n
alternative remedy will not be adequate ... if
the remedy offers only ‘doubtful and limited
relief’ ” Although “the alternative remedy
need not provide relief identical to relief
under the APA,” it must “offer[ ] relief of
the ‘same genre.’ ”
In arguing that a tax refund suit provides an
adequate
alternative
remedy,
the
government emphasizes Klemencic's ability
to recover any assessed overpayment, plus
interest. But that backward-looking relief
differs in kind from the prospective relief
Klemencic could obtain under the APA.
Specifically, requiring Klemencic to proceed
via refund suit would deprive him of the
opportunity to obtain a “certificate of
exemption.” Such certificates are a form of
safe harbor, allowing an individual to obtain
an exemption from the mandate's penalty on
the
basis
of
projected
income,
“notwithstanding any [subsequent] change
in an individual's circumstances.” Unlike the
“prospective[ ]” assurance such certificates
offer, a refund suit would require Klemencic
to violate the law as it now stands, pay a
penalty, and only then challenge the
assessment of the penalty for that previous
year based on his actual income. And even if
Klemencic were to prevail, his relieffinancial restitution would be backwards

looking, meaning that Klemencic would
have to repeat the cycle the following year.
The government offers no suggestion that he
could obtain a certificate of exemption
through a refund action.
Furthermore, it is not clear that Klemencic
could obtain any prospective relief through a
refund action, let alone that which he seeks
under his APA claim—namely, a declaration
that the IRS Rule is invalid and an
injunction barring its implementation. As we
explained in Cohen v. United States, the
provision authorizing refund suits “does not,
at least explicitly, allow for prospective
relief.” … We must therefore conclude that
a tax refund suit is inadequate as an
alternative remedy: it is “doubtful” that it
offers prospective relief at all, and the
monetary relief it does offer is clearly not
“of the same genre” as the relief available to
appellants under the APA. Because a tax
refund suit thus offers Klemencic only
“doubtful and limited relief,” we hold that
the APA provides him with a cause of action
to challenge the IRS Rule and turn to the
merits of his claim.
III
On the merits, this case requires us to
determine whether the ACA permits the IRS
to provide tax credits for insurance
purchased through federal Exchanges. To
make this determination, we begin by asking
“whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue,” for if it has,
we must give effect to its unambiguously
expressed intent. The text of section 36B is
only the starting point of this analysis. That
provision is but one piece of a vast, complex
statutory scheme, and we must consider it
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both on its own and in relation to the ACA's
interconnected provisions and overall
structure so as to interpret the Act, if
possible, “as a symmetrical and coherent
scheme.”
Although both appellants and the
government argue that the ACA, read in its
totality, evinces clear congressional intent,
they dispute what that intent actually is.
Appellants argue that if taxpayers can
receive credits only for plans enrolled in
“through an Exchange established by the
State under section 1311 of the [ACA],”
then the IRS clearly cannot give credits to
taxpayers who purchased insurance on an
Exchange established by the federal
government. After all, the federal
government is not a “State,” and its
authority to establish Exchanges appears in
section 1321 rather than section 1311. The
government counters that appellants take a
blinkered view of the ACA and that sections
1311 and 1321 of the Act establish complete
equivalence between state and federal
Exchanges, such that when the federal
government establishes an Exchange, it does
so standing in the state's shoes. Furthermore,
the government argues, whereas appellants'
construction of section 36B renders other
provisions of the ACA absurd, its own view
brings coherence to the statute and better
promotes the purpose of the Act.
We conclude that appellants have the better
of the argument: a federal Exchange is not
an “Exchange established by the State,”
and section 36B does not authorize the IRS
to provide tax credits for insurance
purchased on federal Exchanges. We reach
this conclusion by the following path: First,

we examine section 36B in light of sections
1311 and 1321, which authorize the
establishment of state and federal
Exchanges, respectively, and conclude
that section
36B plainly
distinguishes
Exchanges established by states from those
established by the federal government. We
then consider the government's arguments
that this construction generates absurd
results but find that it does not render other
provisions of the ACA unworkable, let alone
so
unreasonable
as
to
justify
disregarding section 36B's plain meaning.
Finally, turning to the ACA's purpose and
legislative history, we find that the
government again comes up short in its
efforts to overcome the statutory text. Its
appeals to the ACA's broad aims do not
demonstrate that Congress manifestly meant
something other than what section 36B says.
A
The crux of this case is whether an
Exchange established by the federal
government is an “Exchange established by
the State under section 1311 of the [ACA].”
We therefore begin with the provisions
authorizing states and the federal
government to establish Exchanges. Section
1311 provides that states “shall” establish
Exchanges. But, as the parties agree, despite
its seemingly mandatory language, section
1311 more cajoles than commands. A state
is not literally required to establish an
Exchange; the ACA merely encourages it to
do so. And if a state elects not to (or is
unable to), such that it “will not have any
required Exchange operational by January 1,
2014,” section 1321 directs the federal
government, through the Secretary of Health
7

and Human Services, to “establish and
operate such Exchange within the State.”
The phrase “such Exchange” has twofold
significance. First, the word “such”—
meaning “aforementioned,”—signifies that
the Exchange the Secretary must establish is
the “required Exchange” that the state failed
to establish. In other words, “such” conveys
what a federal Exchange is: the equivalent
of the Exchange a state would have
established had it elected to do so. The
meaning of “Exchange” in the ACA
reinforces and builds on this sense. The
ACA defines an “Exchange” as “an
American
Health
Benefit
Exchange
established under [section 1311 of the
ACA].” If we import that definition into the
text of section 1321, the provision directs
the Secretary to “establish ... such American
Health Benefit Exchange established under
[section 1311 of the ACA] within the State.”
This suggests not only that the Secretary is
to establish the type of exchange described
in section 1311, but also that when she does
so, she acts under section 1311, even though
her authority appears in section 1321. Thus,
section 1321 creates equivalence between
state and federal Exchanges in two respects:
in terms of what they are and the statutory
authority under which they are established.
The problem confronting the IRS Rule is
that subsidies also turn on a third attribute of
Exchanges:
who
established
them.
Under section 36B, subsidies are available
only for plans “enrolled in through an
Exchange established by the State under
section 1311 of the [ACA].” Of the three
elements of that provision—(1) an Exchange
(2) established by the State (3) under section

1311—federal Exchanges satisfy only two:
they are Exchanges established under
section 1311. Nothing in section 1321
deems federally-established Exchanges to be
“Exchange[s] established by the State.” This
omission is particularly significant since
Congress knew how to provide that a nonstate entity should be treated as if it were a
state when it sets up an Exchange. In a
nearby section, the ACA provides that a
U.S. territory that “elects ... to establish an
Exchange ... shall be treated as a State .”
The absence of similar language in section
1321 suggests that even though the federal
government may establish an Exchange
“within the State,” it does not in fact stand in
the state's shoes when doing so.
The dissent attempts to supply this missing
equivalency by pointing to section
1311(d)(1), which provides: “An Exchange
shall be a governmental agency or nonprofit
entity that is established by a State.”
According to the dissent, (d)(1) means that
an Exchange established under section 1311
is, by definition, established by a state.
Therefore, the dissent argues, because
federal Exchanges are established under
section 1311, they too, by definition, are
established by a state.
The premise that (d)(1) is definitional,
however, does not survive examination of
(d)(l)'s context and the ACA's structure. The
other provisions of section 1311(d) are
operational requirements, setting forth what
Exchanges must (or, in some cases, may) do.
Read in keeping with that theme, (d)(1)
would simply require that an Exchange
operate as either a governmental agency or
nonprofit entity. But the dissent would have
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us construe (d)(1) differently. In its view,
(d)(1) plays a definitional role unique among
section 1311(d)'s otherwise operational
provisions, creating a legal fiction that any
Exchange is, by definition, established by a
state, even when, as a matter of fact, it is
not. That reading, however, would render
(d)(1) the odd man out twice over: both
within section 1311(d) and among the
ACA's other definitional provisions, which,
unlike (d)(1), employ the (unmistakably
definitional) formula of “The term ‘X’
means....”
The dissent's reading would also require us
to overlook the fact that section 1311(d)
would be a strange place for Congress to
have buried such a legal fiction. Section
1311, after all, concerns Exchanges that are
established by states in fact; the legal fiction
the dissent urges would matter only to
Exchanges established by the federal
government. To accept the dissent's
construction would therefore transform
(d)(1) into the proverbial elephant in the
mousehole—the “ancillary provision[ ]”
that “alter[s] the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme.” The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that Congress does not
legislate in this manner, and we see no
evidence that it did so here. Indeed, we are
particularly loath to accept the dissent's
construction given that there are far more
natural locations to place this fiction, such as
section 1321 or the provision defining the
term “Exchange.”
The dissent's construction of (d)(1) also
ignores the structural relationship between
sections 1311 and 1321. Just as section
1311(b)(1) assumes that states will establish

Exchanges
in
general,
section
1311(d) assumes that states will carry out
the specific requirements Exchanges must
meet. But if those assumptions prove wrong,
section 1321 assigns the federal government
responsibility both to establish the Exchange
and to ensure that it satisfies the particulars
of section 1311(d). In other words, section
1321 creates a limited scheme of
substitution: the requirements assigned to
states by 1311(d) are transferred to the
federal government if a state fails to
establish an Exchange. The specific
requirement that (d)(1) assumes each state
will fulfill is to establish an Exchange in the
form of “a governmental agency or
nonprofit entity.” So if a state elects not to
participate in the creation of an Exchange,
section 1321 directs the federal government
that it must create “a governmental agency
or nonprofit entity” to serve as the
Exchange. Crucially, this construction does
not entail ignoring the plain meaning of
“established by a State” in section
1311(d)(1); here, section 1321 tells us to
substitute the federal government for the
state under a certain scenario. But there is
nothing comparable with respect to section
36B: no analogue to section 1321 says
that section 36B should be read to
encompass federally-established Exchanges.
Accordingly, we reject the dissent's
argument that, because federal Exchanges
are established under section 1311, they are
by definition “established by a State.”
Instead, sections 1311 and 1321 lead us to
interpret section
36B essentially
as
appellants do. Those provisions, to be sure,
establish some degree of equivalence
between state and federal Exchanges—
9

enough, indeed, that if section 36B had
authorized credits for insurance purchased
on an “Exchange established under section
1311,” the IRS Rule would stand.
But section 36B actually authorizes credits
only for coverage purchased on an
“Exchange established
by
the
State under section
1311,” and
the
government offers no textual basis—
in sections 1311 and 1321 or elsewhere—for
concluding that a federally—established
Exchange is, in fact or legal fiction,
established by a state. Moreover, as we have
noted, that absence is especially glaring
given that the ACA elsewhere provides that
a federal territory that establishes an
Exchange “shall be treated as a State,”
clearly demonstrating that Congress knew
how to deem a non-state entity to be a
“State.” Thus, at least in light of sections
1311 and 1321, the meaning of section
36B appears plain: a federal Exchange is not
an “Exchange established by the State.”
B
The government argues that we should not
adopt the plain meaning of section 36B,
however, because doing so would render
several other provisions of the ACA absurd.
Our obligation to avoid adopting statutory
constructions with absurd results is wellestablished… But we do not disregard
statutory text lightly. The Constitution
assigns the legislative power to Congress,
and Congress alone, and legislating often
entails compromises that courts must
respect. We therefore give the absurdity
principle a narrow domain, insisting that a
given construction cross a “high threshold”
of unreasonableness before we conclude that

a statute does not mean what it says. A
provision thus “may seem odd” without
being “absurd,” and in such instances “it is
up to Congress rather than the courts to fix
it,” even if it “may have been an
unintentional drafting gap.”
i
The government first argues that we must
uphold the IRS Rule to avoid rendering
language in 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f) superfluous.
Titled “Reconciliation of credit and advance
credit,” section 36B(f) requires the IRS to
reduce a taxpayer's end-of-year credit by the
amount of any advance payments made by
the government to the taxpayer's insurer to
offset the cost of monthly premiums. As
relevant here, section 36B(f) also requires
“each Exchange”—i.e., both state and
federal Exchanges—to report certain
information to the government. With respect
to any health plan it provides, an Exchange
must report:
(A) The level of coverage ... and the
period such coverage was in effect.
(B) The total premium for the coverage
without regard to the credit under this
section or cost-sharing reductions under
section 1402 of [the ACA].
(C) The aggregate amount of any
advance payment of such credit or
reductions....
(D) The name, address, and [taxpayer
identification number (TIN) ] of the
primary insured and the name and TIN
of each other individual obtaining
coverage under the policy.
(E) Any information provided to the
Exchange, including any change of
circumstances, necessary to determine
10

eligibility for, and the amount of, such
credit.
(F) Information necessary to determine
whether a taxpayer has received excess
advance payments.
The government contends that these
reporting requirements assume that credits
are available on federal Exchanges, and it
argues that the requirements would be
superfluous, even nonsensical, as applied to
federal Exchanges if we were to reject that
assumption.
Not so. Even if credits are unavailable on
federal Exchanges, reporting by those
Exchanges still serves the purpose of
enforcing the individual mandate—a point
the IRS, in fact, acknowledged in
promulgating a recent regulation. That
regulation exempts insurers from 26 U.S.C.
§ 6055, which otherwise would require that,
for each policy they issue, insurers report to
the IRS such information as “the name,
address, and TIN of the primary insured,”
the dates of coverage, and the “amount (if
any) or any advance payment ... or of any
premium tax credit under section 36B with
respect to such coverage.” The IRS justified
the exemption for insurers on the ground
that “Exchanges must report on this
coverage under section 36B(f)(3).” The
government's claim that section 36B(f)(3)'s
reporting requirement serves no purpose
other than reconciling credits is therefore
simply not true.
Furthermore, holding that credits are
unavailable on federal Exchanges would not
convert the specific reporting requirements
concerning credits into an “ ‘empty gesture.’
” Those requirements would still allow the

reconciling of credits on state Exchanges; as
applied to federal Exchanges, they would
simply
be
over-inclusive.
Overinclusiveness, however, remains a problem
even if we were to agree that section
36B allows
credits
on
federal
Exchanges. Section 36B(f)(3), after all,
mandates reporting “with respect to any
health plan provided through the Exchange,”
even though only plans purchased by
taxpayers with incomes between 100 and
400 percent of the federal poverty line may
be subsidized. A weakness common to both
views of the availability of credits hardly
serves as a basis for choosing between them.
ii
The government next points to the
supposedly absurd consequences appellants'
interpretation of section 36B would have for
section 1312 of the ACA, which defines the
rights of “qualified individuals.” The term “
‘qualified individual’ means, with respect to
an Exchange, an individual who—(i) is
seeking to enroll in a qualified health plan in
the individual market offered through the
Exchange; and (ii) resides in the State that
established the Exchange.” If this provision
is given its plain meaning, then the 36 states
with federal Exchanges (that, obviously, the
states did not establish) have no qualified
individuals. That outcome is absurd, the
government argues, because in its view
section 1312 restricts access to Exchanges to
qualified individuals alone. The absence of
qualified individuals would mean that
federal Exchanges have no customers and
therefore no purpose. The government urges
us
to
avoid
this
outcome
by
construing section 1321 to authorize the
11

federal government to establish Exchanges
“on behalf of ” states that decline to do so.
The government, however, tilts at windmills.
It assumes that when section 1312(a) states
that “[a] qualified individual may enroll in
any qualified health plan available to such
individual and for which such individual is
eligible,” it means that only a qualified
individual may enroll in such a plan. The
obvious flaw in this interpretation is that the
word “only” does not appear in the
provision. We have repeatedly emphasized
that it is “not our role” to “engage in a
statutory rewrite” by “insert[ing] the word
‘only’ here and there.” Section 1312(a)'s
actual language simply establishes the right
of a qualified individual to enroll in any
qualified health plan, at any level of
coverage. On this reading, giving the phrase
“established by the State” its plain meaning
creates no difficulty, let alone absurdity.
Federal Exchanges might not have qualified
individuals, but they would still have
customers—namely, individuals who are not
“qualified individuals.”
…
iii
The government also claims that a plain
meaning reading of section 36B would have
peculiar effects under 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(gg)(l). That provision states that, as a
condition of receiving Medicaid funds, a
State may not tighten its Medicaid eligibility
standards for adults until “the date on which
the Secretary determines that an Exchange
established by the State under [section 1311]
is fully operational.” If a federallyestablished Exchange is not one “established

by the State,” the government argues, states
with federal Exchanges “would never be
relieved of th [is] ... requirement,”
transforming an “interim measure” into a
“perpetual obligation.” But appellants
propose a logical explanation for why the
ACA might establish this rule: to preserve
Medicaid benefits for the impoverished
residents of states where, as a result of
having federally-established Exchanges,
subsidies are unavailable. In this light, the
results produced by giving section 36B its
plain meaning seem sensible, not absurd.
iv
The government urges us, in effect, to strike
from section 36B the phrase “established by
the State,” on the ground that giving force to
its plain meaning renders other provisions of
the Act absurd. But we find that the
government has failed to make the
extraordinary showing required for such
judicial rewriting of an act of Congress.
Nothing about the imperative to read section
36B in harmony with the rest of the ACA
requires interpreting “established by the
State” to mean anything other than what it
plainly says.
C
This conclusion places us at a fork in our
precedent. One line of cases instructs us to
cease our inquiry and give effect to the
statute's unambiguous language. Another
tells us to wade into the legislative history in
the hope of glimpsing “new light on
congressional intent.” But, though we
recognize that our decision about which path
to travel implicates substantial theoretical
questions of statutory interpretation, its
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practical consequences are less momentous
here because both paths lead to the same
destination.
Therefore,
assuming arguendo that it is proper to
consult legislative history when the statutory
text is clear, we consider what light the
ACA's history offers.
We begin by clarifying the role the ACA's
legislative history might play in our
analysis… But legislative history is not the
sole, or even the primary, source of such
evidence. Rather, “[t]he most reliable guide
to congressional intent is the legislation the
Congress enacted.” Where used, legislative
history plays a distinctly secondary role…
Instead, only when “apparently plain
language compels an ‘odd result’ “ might we
look to legislative history to ensure that the “
‘literal application of a statute will [not]
produce a result demonstrably at odds with
the intentions of its drafters.’ ” Thus,
accepting for the sake of argument the
government's contention that the results of
appellants' construction of section 36B are
odd, our inquiry into the ACA's legislative
history is quite narrow. In the face of the
statute's plain meaning-a federal Exchange
is not an “Exchange established by the
State”—we ask only whether the legislative
history provides evidence that this literal
meaning is “demonstrably at odds with the
intentions” of the ACA's drafters. Unless
evidence in the legislative record establishes
that it is, we must hew to the statute's plain
meaning, even if it compels an odd result.
Here, the scant legislative history sheds little
light on the precise question of the
availability of subsidies on federal
Exchanges. The government points, for

example, to a Congressional Budget Office
report from November 2009, before the
ACA's adoption, that calculated the cost of
subsidies based on the assumption that they
would be available in all states. But that
assumption is as consistent with an
expectation that all states would cooperate
(i.e., establish their own Exchanges) as with
an understanding that subsidies would be
available on federal Exchanges as well…
The government and its amici are thus left to
urge the court to infer meaning from silence,
arguing that “during the debates over the
ACA, no one suggested, let alone explicitly
stated, that a State's citizens would lose
access to the tax credits if the State failed to
establish its own Exchange.” The historical
record, however, belies this claim. The
Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions (HELP) proposed a bill
that specifically contemplated penalizing
states that refused to participate in
establishing “American Health Benefit
Gateways,” the equivalent of Exchanges, by
denying credits to such states' residents for
four years. This is not to say that section
36B necessarily incorporated this thinking;
we agree that inferences from unenacted
legislation are too uncertain to be a helpful
guide to the intent behind a specific
provision. But the HELP Committee's bill
certainly demonstrates that members of
Congress at least considered the notion of
using subsidies as an incentive to gain states'
cooperation.
In any case, even if the historical record
were silent, that silence is unhelpful to the
government. For the court to depart from the
ACA's plain meaning, which favors
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appellants, “there must be evidence that
Congress meant something other than what
it literally said,” from which the court can
conclude that applying the statute literally
would be “ ‘demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of [the ACA's] drafters.’ ” …
The government, together with the dissent,
also leans heavily on a more abstract form of
legislative history Congress's broad purpose
in passing the ACA-urging the court to view
section 36B through the lens of the ACA's
economic theory and ultimate aims. They
emphasize that to achieve the goals of “near
universal coverage” and “lower[ing] health
insurance premiums,” the ACA relies on
three interrelated policies: insurance market
reforms prohibiting insurers from denying
coverage or charging higher premiums
based on an individual's health status; the
individual mandate; and subsidies to
individuals purchasing insurance in the
individual market. These policies, the
government and dissent explain, are like the
legs of a three-legged stool; remove any one,
and the ACA will collapse. The insurance
market reforms are necessary to expand the
availability of insurance. The individual
mandate is necessary to avoid the adverse
selection that would result if people could
exploit the insurance market reforms to wait
to purchase insurance until they were sick.
And subsidies are necessary both to make
the mandated insurance affordable and, in so
doing, to expand the reach of the individual
mandate by reducing the cost of insurance
below the threshold-eight percent of
household income-at which taxpayers are
exempt from the mandate's penalty. Given
this structure, the government and dissent
argue that it is “inconceivable” to think

Congress would have risked the ACA's
stability by making subsidies conditional on
states establishing Exchanges.
Yet the supposedly unthinkable scenario the
government and dissent describe—one in
which insurers in states with federal
Exchanges remain subject to the community
rating and guaranteed issue requirements but
lack a broad base of healthy customers to
stabilize prices and avoid adverse
selection—is exactly what the ACA enacts
in such federal territories as the Northern
Mariana Islands, where the Act imposes
guaranteed issue and community rating
requirements without an individual mandate.
This combination, predictably, has thrown
individual insurance markets in the
territories into turmoil. But HHS has
nevertheless refused to exempt the territories
from the guaranteed issue and community
rating requirements, recognizing that,
“[h]owever meritorious” the reasons for
doing so might be, “HHS is not authorized
to choose which provisions of the [ACA]
might apply to the territories.”
…
More generally, the ACA's ultimate aims
shed little light on the “precise question at
issue,” namely, whether subsidies are
available on federal Exchanges because such
Exchanges are “established by the State.” As
the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned,
“it frustrates rather than effectuates
legislative intent simplistically to assume
that whatever furthers the statute's primary
objective must be the law” because “no
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”
Thus, if legislative intent is to be our
lodestar, we cannot assume, as the
14

government does, that section 36B singlemindedly pursues the ACA's lofty goals.

representatives, not by appointed, lifetenured judges.

The fact is that the legislative record
provides little indication one way or the
other of congressional intent, but the
statutory text does. Section 36B plainly
makes subsidies available only on
Exchanges established by states. And in the
absence of any contrary indications, that text
is conclusive evidence of Congress's intent.
To hold otherwise would be to say that
enacted legislation, on its own, does not
command our respect—an utterly untenable
proposition. Accordingly, applying the
statute's plain meaning, we find that section
36B unambiguously
forecloses
the
interpretation embodied in the IRS Rule and
instead limits the availability of premium tax
credits to state-established Exchanges.

Thus, although our decision has major
consequences, our role is quite limited:
deciding whether the IRS Rule is a
permissible reading of the ACA. Having
concluded it is not, we reverse the district
court and remand with instructions to grant
summary judgment to appellants and vacate
the IRS Rule.

IV
We reach this conclusion, frankly, with
reluctance. At least until states that wish to
can set up Exchanges, our ruling will likely
have significant consequences both for the
millions of individuals receiving tax credits
through federal Exchanges and for health
insurance markets more broadly. But, high
as those stakes are, the principle of
legislative supremacy that guides us is
higher still. Within constitutional limits,
Congress is supreme in matters of policy,
and the consequence of that supremacy is
that our duty when interpreting a statute is to
ascertain the meaning of the words of the
statute duly enacted through the formal
legislative process. This limited role serves
democratic interests by ensuring that policy
is made by elected, politically accountable

EDWARDS,
dissenting:

Senior

Circuit

Judge,

This case is about Appellants' not-so-veiled
attempt to gut the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). The ACA
requires every State to establish a health
insurance “Exchange,” which “shall be a
governmental agency or nonprofit entity that
is established by a State.” The Department
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) is
required to establish “such Exchange” when
the State elects not to create one. Taxpayers
who purchase insurance from an Exchange
and whose income is between 100% and
400% of the poverty line are eligible for
premium subsidies. Appellants challenge
regulations issued by the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) and HHS making these
subsidies available in all States, including
States in which HHS has established an
Exchange on behalf of the State. In support
of their challenge, Appellants rely on a
specious argument that there is no
“Exchange established by the State” in
States with HHS-created Exchanges and,
therefore, that taxpayers who purchase
insurance in these States cannot receive
subsidies.

15

As explained below, there are three critical
components to the ACA: nondiscrimination
requirements applying to insurers; the
“individual mandate” requiring individuals
who are not covered by an employer to
purchase minimum insurance coverage or to
pay a tax penalty; and premium subsidies
which ensure that the individual mandate
will have a broad enough sweep to attract
enough healthy individuals into the
individual insurance markets to create
stability. These components work in
tandem. At the time of the ACA's
enactment, it was well understood that
without the subsidies, the individual
mandate was not viable as a mechanism for
creating a stable insurance market.
Appellants' proffered construction of the
statute would permit States to exempt many
people from the individual mandate and
thereby thwart a central element of the
ACA.
As
Appellants' amici candidly
acknowledge, if subsidies are unavailable to
taxpayers in States with HHS-created
Exchanges, “the structure of the ACA will
crumble.” It is inconceivable that Congress
intended to give States the power to cause
the ACA to “crumble.”
Appellants contend that the phrase
“Exchange established by the State” in §
36B unambiguously bars subsidies to
individuals who purchase insurance in States
in which HHS created the Exchange on the
State's behalf.” This argument fails because
“the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.” When the
language of § 36B is viewed in context i.e., in conjunction with other provisions of

the ACA-it is quite clear that the statute does
not reveal the plain meaning that Appellants
would like to find.
The majority opinion ignores the obvious
ambiguity in the statute and claims to rest on
plain meaning where there is none to be
found. In so doing, the majority misapplies
the applicable standard of review, refuses to
give deference to the IRS's and HHS's
permissible constructions of the ACA, and
issues a judgment that portends disastrous
consequences. I therefore dissent.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The first question a reviewing court must
ask in a case of this sort is whether the
disputed provisions of the statute are clear
beyond dispute. “If a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on
the precise question at issue, that intention is
the law and must be given effect.” In
determining whether a statutory provision is
ambiguous, however, a court must evaluate
it within the context of the statute as a
whole:
[A] reviewing court should not confine
itself to examining a particular statutory
provision in isolation. Rather, the
meaning-or ambiguity-of certain words
or phrases may only become evident
when placed in context.... It is a
fundamental
canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute
must be read in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.
When a “court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its
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own construction on the statute.” Rather,
“the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute,” that is, whether
the agency's interpretation is “manifestly
contrary to the statute.”
Appellants argue that Chevron deference is
unwarranted because some of the provisions
at issue “are codified in a chapter of Title
42 ... the domain of HHS, not the IRS,” and
the “IRS has no power to enforce or
administer those provisions.” Appellants'
position
is
mistaken. Chevron applies
because IRS and HHS are tasked with
administering the provisions of the ACA in
coordination. Here, there is no issue of one
agency interpreting the statute in a way that
conflicts
with
the
other
agency's
interpretation. The IRS's rule defines
“Exchange” by reference to the HHS's
definition, which provides that subsidies are
available
to
low-income
taxpayers
purchasing insurance on an Exchange
“regardless of whether the Exchange is
established and operated by a State ... or by
HHS.”
Appellants
also
argue
that Chevron deference is precluded by the
canon that “tax credits ‘must be expressed in
clear and unambiguous terms.’ ” Again,
Appellants' position is mistaken. The
Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he
principles underlying [the]
decision
in Chevron apply with full force in the tax
context.”
II. ANALYSIS
Appellants' argument focuses almost
entirely on 26 U.S.C. § 36B, considered in

isolation from the other provisions of the
ACA. Repeating the phrase “Exchange
established by the State” as a mantra
throughout their brief, Appellants contend
that this language unambiguously indicates
that § 36B(b) conditions refundable tax
credits
on
a State—and
not HHS—
establishing an Exchange.
Appellants' argument unravels, however,
when the phrase “established by the State” is
subject to close scrutiny in view of the
surrounding provisions in the ACA. In
particular, § 36B has no plain meaning when
read
in
conjunction
with §
18031(d)(1) and § 18041(c). And, more
fundamentally, the purported plain meaning
of § 36B(b) would subvert the careful policy
scheme crafted by Congress, which
understood when it enacted the ACA that
subsidies were critically necessary to ensure
that the goals of the ACA could be achieved.
Perhaps because they appreciate that no
legitimate method of statutory interpretation
ascribes to Congress the aim of tearing
down the very thing it attempted to
construct, Appellants in this litigation have
invented a narrative to explain why
Congress would want health insurance
markets to fail in States that did not elect to
create their own Exchanges. Congress, they
assert, made the subsidies conditional in
order to incentivize the States to create their
own exchanges. This argument is
disingenuous, and it is wrong. Not only is
there
no
evidence
that
anyone
in Congress thought § 36B operated as a
condition, there is also no evidence that any
State thought of it as such. The statutory
provision presumes the existence of
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subsidies and was drafted to establish a
formula for the payment of tax credits, not
to impose a significant and substantial
condition on the States.
In the end, the question for this court is
whether § 36B unambiguously operates as a
condition limiting the tax subsidies that
Congress understood were a necessary part
of a functioning insurance market
to only those States that created their own
exchange.
The
phrase
“Exchange
established by the State,” standing alone,
suggests the affirmative. But there is
powerful evidence to the contrary—both
in § 36B and the provisions it references,
and in the Act as a whole-that shows
Appellants' argument to be fatally flawed.
It is not the prerogative of this court to
interpret the ambiguities uncovered in the
ACA. Congress has delegated this authority
to the IRS and HHS. And the interpretation
given by these agencies is not
only permissible but
also
the better construction of the statute
because § 36B is not clearly drafted as a
condition, because the Act empowers HHS
to establish exchanges on behalf of the
States, because parallel provisions indicate
that Congress thought that federal subsidies
would be provided on HHS-created
exchanges, and, most importantly, because
Congress established a careful legislative
scheme by which individual subsidies
were essential to the basic viability of
individual insurance markets.
A. Appellants' “Plain Meaning” Argument
Viewed in Context

We cannot read § 36B in isolation; we must
also consider the specific context of the
provision and the “broader context of the
statute as a whole.” And viewing the matter
through this wider lens, as we must, the
provision which initially might appear plain
is far from unambiguous. To begin with, as
the Government points out, § 36B refers to
premiums for health plans enrolled in
through “an Exchange established by the
State under 1311 [i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 18031].”
The cross-referenced provision—42 U.S.C.
§ 18031—contains language indicating
that all States are required to establish an
exchange under the section. In other words,
if our statutory universe consisted only of
these two provisions, it would be clear that §
36B intended that residents in all States
would receive subsidies because all States
were required to create such exchanges by
the section of the Act referenced in § 36B.
Of course, the ACA is broader than just §
36B and § 18031, and in 42 U.S.C. § 18041
it permits a State to elect to allow HHS to
establish the Exchange on behalf of the
State. In such circumstances, however, the
Act requires HHS to establish and operate
“such Exchange.” The use of “such” can
reasonably be interpreted to deem the HHScreated Exchange to be the equivalent of an
Exchange created in the first instance by the
State.
Indeed, the Act says as much when it
defines the term “Exchange” as “a
governmental agency or nonprofit entity that
is established by a State.” It is clear that §
18031 is the source of the definition of the
term “Exchange” under the Act. It is also
clear that § 18031 defines every “Exchange”
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under the Act as “a governmental agency or
nonprofit entity that is established by a
State.” Because § 18041(c) authorizes the
federal
government
to
establish
“Exchanges,” the phrase “established by the
State” in § 18031 must be broad enough to
accommodate Exchanges created by the
HHS
on a State's
behalf. Section
36B expressly incorporates this broad
definition of “Exchange” when it uses the
phrase an “Exchange established by the
State under [§ 18031].” Therefore, the
phrase “established by the State” in § 36B is
reasonably understood to take its meaning
from the cognate language in the
incorporated definition in § 18031, which
embraces Exchanges created by HHS on the
State's behalf. These provisions belie the
“plain meaning” that Appellants attempt to
attribute to § 36B.
What is more, Appellants' interpretation of
the operative language in § 36B sits
awkwardly with the section's structure.
Subsection (a) provides tax credits to any
“applicable taxpayer,” defined in reference
to the poverty line and without regard to
what the taxpayer's State has or has not
done. Subsection (b) then establishes a
numerical formula for calculating the
amount of the subsidy. It is only in the
context of this numerical formula and its
definition of “coverage month” that the
purported condition is found. If Congress
intended to create a significant condition on
taxpayer eligibility for subsidies of the sort
advocated by Appellants, one would expect
that it would say so plainly and
clearly. There is no “if/then” or other such
conditional language in § 36B.

B. The Statute Read as a Whole
1. The “Three–Legged Stool” and the
Indispensable Role of the Tax Subsidies
Appellants' interpretation is implausible
because it would destroy the fundamental
policy structure and goals of the ACA that
are apparent when the statute is read as a
whole. A key component to achieving the
Act's goal of “near-universal coverage” for
all Americans is a series of measures to
reform the individual insurance market.
These
measures—nondiscrimination
requirements applying to insurers, the
individual
mandate,
and
premium
subsidies—work in tandem, each one a
necessary component to ensure the basic
viability of each State's insurance market.
Because premium subsidies are so critical to
an insurance market's sustainability,
Appellants' interpretation of § 36B would, in
the words of Appellants' amici, cause “the
structure of the ACA [to] crumble.”
This point is essential and worth explaining
in detail. The ACA has been described as a
“three-legged stool” in view of its three
interrelated and interdependent reforms. The
first “leg” of the ACA is the “guaranteed
issue” and “community rating” provisions,
which prohibit insurers from denying
coverage based on health status or history,
and require insurers to offer coverage to all
individuals at community-wide rates. But
such nondiscrimination provisions cannot
function alone because of the problem of
“adverse selection.” When insurers cannot
deny coverage or charge sick or high-risk
individuals higher premiums, healthy people
delay purchasing insurance (knowing they
will not be denied coverage if and when they
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become sick), and insurers' risk pools thus
become skewed toward high-risk individuals
(as they are the only ones willing to pay the
premiums). The result is that insurers wind
up paying more per average on each policy,
which leads them to increase the
community-wide rate, which, in turn, serves
only to exacerbate the “adverse selection”
process (as now only those who
are really sick
will
find
insurance
worthwhile). This is the so-called “deathspiral,” which Congress understood would
doom each State's individual insurance
market in the absence of a multifaceted
reform program.
This is where the individual mandate, the
second “leg” of the ACA, comes in.
Congress recognized:
By significantly increasing health
insurance coverage, the [individual
coverage] requirement, together with
the other provisions of this Act, will
minimize this adverse selection and
broaden the health insurance risk pool
to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums.
Accordingly, the Act requires each
individual who is not covered by an
employer to purchase minimum coverage or
to pay a tax penalty. But recognizing that
individuals cannot be made to purchase what
they cannot afford, Congress provided that
the mandate would not apply if the cost of
insurance exceeds eight percent of the
taxpayer's income after subsidies.
The third “leg” of the ACA is the subsidies.
The subsidies ensure that the individual
mandate will have a broad enough sweep to
attract enough healthy individuals into the

individual insurance markets to create
stability, i.e., to prevent an adverse-selection
death spiral. Without the subsidies, the
individual mandate is simply not viable as a
mechanism for creating a stable insurance
market: the lowest level of coverage for
typical subsidy-eligible participants will cost
23% of income, meaning that these
individuals will be exempt from the
mandate. Congress was informed of the
importance of the subsidies to the overall
legislative scheme. It is thus no surprise that
Congress provided generous subsidies in the
ACA and, importantly, expressly linked the
operation of the individual mandate to the
cost of insurance after taking account of the
subsidies.
If nothing else, it is clear that premium
subsidies are an essential component of the
regulatory framework established by the
ACA. If, as Appellants contend, a State
could block subsidies by electing not to
establish an Exchange, this would exempt a
large number of taxpayers from the
individual mandate, cause the risk pool to
skew toward higher risk people, and
effectively cut the heart out of the ACA.
This is one of the points that was made in
the joint opinion by Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito
in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius.
This “adverse selection” is precisely what
Congress sought to avoid when it enacted
the individual mandate.
Section 36B cannot be interpreted divorced
from the ACA's unmistakable regulatory
scheme in which premium subsidies are an
indispensable component of creating viable
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and stable individual insurance markets. Due
regard for the carefully crafted legislative
scheme casts § 36B in a clearer light.
“Congress ... does not alter the fundamental
details of a regulatory scheme in vague
terms or ancillary provisions—it does not,
one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes.” If Congress meant to deny
subsidies to taxpayers in States with HHScreated Exchanges—thereby initiating an
adverse-selection death-spiral that would
effectively gut the statute in those States—
one would expect to find this limit set forth
in terms as clear as day. But the subsection
defining which taxpayers are eligible for
subsidies make no mention of Stateestablished Exchanges. Subsidies are
available to an “applicable taxpayer,” and
“applicable taxpayer” is defined as any
individual whose household income for the
taxable year is between 100% and 400% of
the poverty line.
2. The Advance Payment Reporting
Requirements of § 36B(f)(3)
One of the subsections in § 36B—which is
the section upon which Appellants stake
their case—makes it clear that Congress
intended that taxpayers on HHS-created
Exchanges would be eligible for subsidies.
Subsection (f), entitled “Reconciliation of
credit and advance credit,” tasks the IRS
with reducing the amount of a taxpayer's
end-of-year premium tax credit under §
36B by the sum of any advance payments of
the credit. Crucially, subsection (f)
establishes
reporting
requirements
that expressly apply to HHS-created
Exchanges. These reporting requirements
mandate that Exchanges provide certain

information to the IRS, including the
“aggregate amount of any advance payment
of such credit”; information needed to
determine the taxpayer's “eligibility for, and
the amount of, such credit”; and
“[i]nformation necessary to determine
whether a taxpayer has received excess
advance payments.” The self-evident
primary purpose of these requirements—
reconciling end-of-year premium tax credits
with advance payments of such credits—
could not be met with respect to Exchanges
created by HHS on behalf of a State if these
Exchanges were not authorized to deliver
tax credits. It is thus plain from subsection
(f) that Congress intended credits under §
36B to be available to taxpayers in States
with HHS-created Exchanges.
In a letter submitted to the court before oral
argument, Appellants cited an IRS
regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 1.6055–1(d)(1), that
addresses
information
reporting
requirements. “In order to reduce the
compliance burden on” insurers, the IRS
decided not to require insurers “to report
under section 6055 for coverage under
individual market qualified health plans
purchased through an Exchange because
Exchanges must report on this coverage
under section 36B(f)(3).” Appellants seem
to think that this regulation somehow
vindicates their view of § 36B(f)(3), but
their argument makes no sense. That the IRS
determined that additional reporting by
insurers in specified circumstances was
unnecessary does not imply that Congress
drafted § 36B(f)(3) solely to enforce the
individual mandate, as Appellants would
have it. What is clear here is that §
36B(f)(3)establishes reporting requirements
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for the principal purpose of requiring
disclosure of information concerning
advanced payments of tax credits, a purpose
which cannot be squared with Appellants'
interpretation under which no credits are
available on federally-created Exchanges.
3. Other Provisions
There are two other provisions of the ACA
that strongly support the Government's
claim that the statute, read as a whole,
permits taxpayers who purchase insurance in
non-electing States to receive subsidies.
First, the statute defines a “qualified
individual” as a person who “resides in the
State that established the Exchange.” There
is no separate definition of “qualified
individual” for States with HHS-created
Exchanges. If an HHS-created Exchange
does not count as established by the State it
is in, there would be no individuals
“qualified” to purchase coverage in the 34
States with HHS-created Exchanges. This
would make little sense.
Second, in a subparagraph entitled
“Assurance of exchange coverage for
targeted low-income children unable to be
provided child health assistance as a result
of funding shortfalls,” the ACA requires
States to “ensure” that low-income children
who are not covered under the State's child
health plan are enrolled in a health plan that
is offered through “an Exchange established
by the State under [§ 18031].” Here again,
the statute simply presumes that the
existence
of
such
State-established
exchanges. The statute's objective of
“assur[ing] exchange coverage for targeted
low-income children ” would be largely lost
if States with HHS-created Exchanges are

excluded. There is nothing in the statute to
indicate that Congress meant to exclude
benefits for low-income children in the 34
States in which HHS has established an
Exchange on behalf of the State.
C. Appellants' Extraordinary Subsidies–
As–Incentive Argument
The record indicates that, when the ACA
was enacted, no State even considered the
possibility that its taxpayers would be
denied subsidies if the State opted to allow
HHS to establish an Exchange on its behalf.
Not one. Indeed no State even suggested that
a lack of subsidies factored into its decision
whether to create its own Exchange. “States
were motivated by a mix of policy
considerations, such as flexibility and
control, and ‘strategic’ calculations by ACA
opponents, not the availability of tax
credits.” The fact that all States recognized
and protested the Medicaid expansion
condition, while no State raised any concern
over the purported subsidy-condition shows
that Appellants' argument is at best fanciful.
The single piece of evidence that Appellants
cite to support their claim that Congress
intended to restrict subsidies to State-run
Exchanges is an article by a law professor.
There is no evidence, however, that anyone
in Congress read, cited, or relied on this
article.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has made it clear that
“[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory
language is determined by reference to the
language itself, the specific context in which
that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole.” We
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cannot review a “particular statutory
provision in isolation.... It is a fundamental
canon of statutory construction that the
words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.” Following these
precepts and reading the ACA as a whole, it
is clear that the statute does not
unambiguously provide that individuals who
purchase insurance from an Exchange
created by HHS on behalf of a State are
ineligible to receive a tax credit. The
majority opinion evinces a painstaking
effort—covering many pages—attempting
to show that there is no ambiguity in the
ACA. The result, I think, is to prove just the
opposite.
The IRS's and HHS's constructions of the
statute are perfectly consistent with the

statute's text, structure, and purpose, while
Appellants' interpretation would “crumble”
the Act's structure. Therefore, we certainly
cannot hold that that the agencies'
regulations are “manifestly contrary to the
statute.” This court owes deference to the
agencies' interpretations of the ACA.
Unfortunately, by imposing the Appellants'
myopic construction on the administering
agencies without any regard for the overall
statutory scheme, the majority opinion
effectively ignores the basic tenets of
statutory construction, as well as the
principles of Chevron deference. Because
the proposed judgment of the majority defies
the will of Congress and the permissible
interpretations of the agencies to whom
Congress has delegated the authority to
interpret and enforce the terms of the ACA,
I dissent.
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King v. Burwell
Ruling Below: King v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 637365 (E.D. Va. 2014).
Virginia residents, not wanting to purchase comprehensive health insurance, brought action
challenging Internal Revenue Service (IRS) final rule, which implemented premium tax credit
provision of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) by authorizing tax credits to
individuals who purchased health insurance on both state-run and federally-facilitated insurance
“Exchanges”. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia government's
motion to dismiss. Residents appealed.
Question Presented: Whether the IRS's interpretation of the premium tax credit provision of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is contrary to the language of the statute, which
Plaintiffs assert authorizes tax credits only for individuals who purchase insurance on state-run
Exchanges.

David KING; Douglas Hurst; Brenda Levy; Rose Luck, Plaintiff-Appellants,
v.
Sylvia Matthews BURWELL, in her official capacity as U.S. Secretary of Health and
Human Services; United States Department of Health & Human Services; Jacob Lew, in
his official capacity as U.S. Secretary of the Treasury; United States Department of the
Treasury; Internal Revenue Service; John Koskinen, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Defendants–Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided on July 22, 2014
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiffs-appellants bring this suit
challenging the validity of an Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) final rule
implementing the premium tax credit
provision of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (the “ACA” or “Act”).
The final rule interprets the ACA as
authorizing the IRS to grant tax credits to
individuals who purchase health insurance
on both state-run insurance “Exchanges”
and
federally-facilitated
“Exchanges”
created and operated by the Department of

Health and Human Services (“HHS”). The
plaintiffs
contend
that
the
IRS's
interpretation is contrary to the language of
the statute, which, they assert, authorizes tax
credits only for individuals who purchase
insurance on state-run Exchanges. For
reasons explained below, we find that the
applicable statutory language is ambiguous
and subject to multiple interpretations.
Applying
deference
to
the
IRS's
determination, however, we uphold the rule
as a permissible exercise of the agency's
discretion. We thus affirm the judgment of
the district court.
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I.
In March of 2010, Congress passed the ACA
to “increase the number of Americans
covered by health insurance and decrease
the cost of health care.” Nat'l Fed'n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB ). To increase the
availability of affordable insurance plans,
the Act provides for the establishment of
“Exchanges,” through which individuals can
purchase competitively-priced health care
coverage. Critically, the Act provides a
federal tax credit to millions of low- and
middle-income Americans to offset the cost
of insurance policies purchased on the
Exchanges. The Exchanges facilitate this
process by advancing an individual's eligible
tax credit dollars directly to health insurance
providers as a means of reducing the upfront
cost of plans to consumers.
Section 1311 of the Act provides that
“[e]ach State shall, not later than January 1,
2014, establish an American Health Benefit
Exchange.” However, § 1321 of the Act
clarifies that a state may “elect” to establish
an Exchange. Section 1321(c) further
provides that if a state does not “elect” to
establish an Exchange by January 1, 2014,
or fails to meet certain federal requirements
for the Exchanges, “the Secretary [of HHS]
shall ... establish and operate such exchange
within the State....” Only sixteen states plus
the District of Columbia have elected to set
up their own Exchanges; the remaining
thirty-four states rely on federally-facilitated
Exchanges.
Eligibility for the premium tax credits is
calculated according to 26 U.S.C. § 36B.
This section defines the annual “premium
assistance credit amount” as the sum of the

monthly premium assistance amounts for
“all coverage months of the taxpayer
occurring during the taxable year.” A
“coverage month” is one in which the
taxpayer is enrolled in a health plan
“through an Exchange established by the
State under section 1311.”
In addition to the tax credits, the Act
requires most Americans to obtain
“minimum essential” coverage or pay a tax
penalty imposed by the IRS. However, the
Act includes an unaffordability exemption
that excuses low-income individuals for
whom the annual cost of health coverage
exceeds eight percent of their projected
household income. The cost of coverage is
calculated as the annual premium for the
least expensive insurance plan available on
an Exchange offered in a consumer's state,
minus the tax credit described above. The
tax credits thereby reduce the number of
individuals exempt from the minimum
coverage requirement, and in turn increase
the number of individuals who must either
purchase health insurance coverage, albeit at
a discounted rate, or pay a penalty.
The IRS has promulgated regulations
making the premium tax credits available to
qualifying individuals who purchase health
insurance on both state-run and federallyfacilitated Exchanges. (collectively the “IRS
Rule”). The IRS Rule provides that the
credits shall be available to anyone “enrolled
in one or more qualified health plans
through an Exchange,” and then adopts by
cross-reference an HHS definition of
“Exchange” that includes any Exchange,
“regardless of whether the Exchange is
established and operated by a State ... or by
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HHS.” Individuals who purchase insurance
through federally-facilitated Exchanges are
thus eligible for the premium tax credits
under the IRS Rule. In response to
commentary that this interpretation might
conflict with the text of the statute, the IRS
issued the following explanation:
The statutory language of section
36B and other provisions of the
Affordable Care Act support the
interpretation that credits are available
to taxpayers who obtain coverage
through a State Exchange, regional
Exchange, subsidiary Exchange, and the
Federally-facilitated
Exchange.
Moreover, the relevant legislative
history does not demonstrate that
Congress intended to limit the premium
tax credit to State Exchanges.
Accordingly, the final regulations
maintain the rule in the proposed
regulations because it is consistent with
the language, purpose, and structure
of section 36B and the Affordable Care
Act as a whole.
The plaintiffs in this case are Virginia
residents who do not want to purchase
comprehensive health insurance. Virginia
has declined to establish a state-run
Exchange and is therefore served by the
prominent federally-facilitated Exchange
known as HealthCare.gov. Without the
premium tax credits, the plaintiffs would be
exempt from the individual mandate under
the unaffordability exemption. With the
credits, however, the reduced costs of the
policies available to the plaintiffs subject
them to the minimum coverage penalty.
According to the plaintiffs, then, as a result
of the IRS Rule, they will incur some
financial cost because they will be forced

either to purchase insurance or pay the
individual mandate penalty.
The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the IRS
Rule exceeds the agency's statutory
authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is
contrary to law in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The
plaintiffs contend that the statutory language
calculating the amount of premium tax
credits according to the cost of the insurance
policy that the taxpayer “enrolled in through
an Exchange established by the State under
[§ 1311] ” precludes the IRS's interpretation
that the credits are also available on national
Exchanges. The district court disagreed,
finding that the statute as a whole clearly
evinced Congress's intent to make the tax
credits available nationwide. The district
court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss, and the plaintiffs timely appealed.
II.
We must first address whether the plaintiffs'
claims are justiciable. The defendants make
two arguments on this point: (1) that the
plaintiffs lack standing; and (2) that the
availability of a tax-refund action acts as an
independent bar to the plaintiffs' claims
under the APA.
A.
We review de novo the legal question of
whether plaintiffs have standing to sue.
Article III standing requires a litigant to
demonstrate “an invasion of a legally
protected interest” that is “concrete and
particularized” and “ ‘actual or imminent.’ ”
The plaintiffs premise their standing on the
claim that, if they were not eligible for the
premium tax credits, they would qualify for
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the unaffordability exemption in 26 U.S.C. §
5000A and would therefore not be subject to
the tax penalty for failing to maintain
minimum essential coverage. Thus, because
of the credits, the plaintiffs argue that they
face a direct financial burden because they
are forced either to purchase insurance or
pay the penalty.
We agree that this represents a concrete
economic injury that is directly traceable to
the IRS Rule. The IRS Rule forces the
plaintiffs to purchase a product they
otherwise would not, at an expense to them,
or to pay the tax penalty for failing to
comply with the individual mandate, also
subjecting them to some financial cost…
The defendants' argument against standing is
premised on the claim that the plaintiffs
want to purchase “catastrophic” insurance
coverage, which in some cases is more
expensive than subsidized comprehensive
coverage required by the Act. The
defendants thus claim that the plaintiffs have
acknowledged
they
would
actually
expend more money on a separate policy
even if they were eligible for the credits.
Regardless of the viability of this argument,
it rests on an incorrect premise. The
defendants misread the plaintiffs' complaint,
which, while mentioning the possibility that
several of the plaintiffs wish to purchase
catastrophic coverage, also clearly alleges
that each plaintiff does not want to buy
comprehensive, ACA-compliant coverage
and is harmed by having to do so or pay a
penalty. The harm in this case is having to
choose between ACA-compliant coverage
and the penalty, both of which represent a
financial cost to the plaintiffs. That harm is

actual or imminent, and is directly traceable
to the IRS Rule. The plaintiffs thus have
standing to present their claims.
B.
The defendants also argue that the
availability of a tax-refund action bars the
plaintiffs' claims under the APA. The
defendants assert that the proper course of
action for the plaintiffs is to pay the tax
penalty and then present their legal
arguments against the IRS Rule as part of a
tax-refund action brought under either 26
U.S.C. § 7422(a) or the Little Tucker Act.
The defendants do not, nor could they, assert
this as a jurisdictional bar, but instead point
to “general equitable principles disfavoring
the issuance of federal injunctions against
taxes, absent clear proof that available
remedies at law [are] inadequate.” The
defendants argue that a tax refund action
presents an “adequate remedy” that the
plaintiffs must first pursue before
challenging the IRS Rule directly under the
APA.
The defendants' arguments are not
persuasive. First, they fail to point to a
single case in which a court has refused to
entertain a similar suit on the grounds that
the parties were required to first pursue a
tax-refund action under 26 U.S.C. §
7422(a) or 28 U.S .C. § 1346. Moreover, the
plaintiffs are not seeking a tax refund; they
ask for no monetary relief, alleging instead
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
in an attempt to forestall the lose-lose choice
(in their minds) of purchasing a product they
do not want or paying the penalty. Section
7422(a) does not allow for prospective
relief. Instead, it bars suit “for
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the recovery of any internal revenue tax
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected.” Similarly, “[t]he
Little Tucker Act does not authorize claims
that seek primarily equitable relief.”
It is clear, then, that the alternative forms of
relief suggested by the defendants would not
afford the plaintiffs the complete relief they
seek. This is simply not a typical tax refund
action in which an individual taxpayer
complains of the manner in which a tax was
assessed
or
collected
and
seeks
reimbursement for wrongly paid sums. The
plaintiffs here challenge the legality of a
final agency action, which is consistent with
the APA's underlying purpose of
“remov[ing] obstacles to judicial review of
agency action.” Requiring the plaintiffs to
choose between purchasing insurance and
thereby waiving their claims or paying the
tax and challenging the IRS Rule after the
fact creates just such an obstacle. We
therefore find that the plaintiffs' suit is not
barred under the APA.
III.
Turning to the merits, “we review questions
of statutory construction de novo.” Because
this case concerns a challenge to an agency's
construction of a statute, we apply the
familiar two-step analytic framework set
forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. At Chevron's first step, a
court looks to the “plain meaning” of the
statute to determine if the regulation
responds to it. If it does, that is the end of
the inquiry and the regulation stands.
However, if the statute is susceptible to
multiple interpretations, the court then
moves to Chevron's second step and defers

to the agency's interpretation so long as it is
based on a permissible construction of the
statute.
A.
At step one, “[i]f the statute is clear and
unambiguous ‘that is the end of the matter,
for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.’ ” A statute is ambiguous
only if the disputed language is “reasonably
susceptible of different interpretations.” …
Courts should employ all the traditional
tools
of statutory construction in
determining whether Congress has clearly
expressed its intent regarding the issue in
question.
1.
In construing a statute's meaning, the court
“begin[s], as always, with the language of
the statute.” As described above, 26 U.S.C.
§ 36B provides that the premium assistance
amount is the sum of the monthly premium
assistance amounts for all “coverage
months” for which the taxpayer is covered
during a year. A “coverage month” is one in
which “the taxpayer ... is covered by a
qualified health plan ... enrolled in through
an Exchange established by the State under
[§ ] 1311 of the [Act].” Similarly, the statute
calculates an individual's tax credit by
totaling the “premium assistance amounts”
for all “coverage months” in a given year.
The “premium assistance amount” is based
in part on the cost of the monthly premium
for the health plan that the taxpayer
purchased “through an Exchange established
by the State under [§ ] 1311.”
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The plaintiffs assert that the plain language
of both relevant subsections in § 36B is
determinative. They contend that in defining
the terms “coverage months” and “premium
assistance amount” by reference to
Exchanges that are “established by the State
under [§ ] 1311,” Congress limited the
availability of tax credits to individuals
purchasing insurance on state Exchanges.
Under the plaintiffs' construction, the
premium credit amount for individuals
purchasing insurance through a federal
Exchange would always be zero.
The plaintiffs' primary rationale for their
interpretation is that the language says what
it says, and that it clearly mentions state-run
Exchanges under § 1311. If Congress meant
to include federally-run Exchanges, it would
not have specifically chosen the word
“state” or referenced § 1311. The federal
government is not a “State,” and so the
phrase “Exchange established by the State
under [§ ] 1311,” standing alone, supports
the notion that credits are unavailable to
consumers on federal Exchanges. Further,
the plaintiffs assert that because state and
federal Exchanges are referred to separately
in § 1311 and § 1321, the omission in 26
U.S.C. § 36B of any reference to federal
Exchanges established under § 1321
represents an intentional choice on behalf of
Congress to exclude federal Exchanges and
include only state Exchanges established
under § 1311.
There can be no question that there is a
certain sense to the plaintiffs' position. If
Congress did in fact intend to make the tax
credits available to consumers on both state
and federal Exchanges, it would have been

easy to write in broader language, as it did in
other places in the statute.
However, when conducting statutory
analysis, “a reviewing court should not
confine itself to examining a particular
statutory provision in isolation. Rather, [t]he
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words
or phrases may only become evident when
placed in context.” With this in mind, the
defendants' primary counterargument points
to ACA §§ 1311 and 1321, which, when
read in tandem with 26 U.S.C. § 36B,
provide an equally plausible understanding
of the statute, and one that comports with
the IRS's interpretation that credits are
available nationwide.
As noted, § 1311 provides that “[e]ach State
shall, not later than January 1, 2014,
establish an American Health Benefit
Exchange [.]” It goes on to say that “[a]n
Exchange shall be a governmental agency or
nonprofit entity that is established by a
State,” apparently narrowing the definition
of “Exchange” to encompass only statecreated Exchanges. ACA § 1311(d)(1).
Similarly, the definitions section of the Act,
§ 1563(b), provides that “[t]he term
‘Exchange’ means an American Health
Benefit Exchange established under [§ ]
1311,” further supporting the notion that all
Exchanges should be considered as if they
were established by a State.
Of course, § 1311's directive that each State
establish an Exchange cannot be understood
literally in light of § 1321, which provides
that a state may “elect” to do so. Section
1321(c) provides that if a state fails to
establish an Exchange by January 1, 2014,
the Secretary “shall ... establish and
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operate such Exchange within the State and
the Secretary shall take such actions as are
necessary to implement such other
requirements.” The defendants' position is
that the term “such Exchange” refers to a
state Exchange that is set up and operated by
HHS. In other words, the statute mandates
the existence of state Exchanges, but directs
HHS to establish such Exchanges when the
states fail to do so themselves. In the
absence of state action, the federal
government is required to step in and create,
by definition, “an American Health Benefit
Exchange established under [§ ] 1311” on
behalf of the state.
Having thus explained the parties'
competing primary arguments, the court is
of the opinion that the defendants have the
stronger position, although only slightly.
Given that Congress defined “Exchange” as
an Exchange established by the state, it
makes sense to read § 1321(c)'s directive
that HHS establish “such Exchange” to
mean that the federal government acts on
behalf of the state when it establishes its
own Exchange. However, the court cannot
ignore the common-sense appeal of the
plaintiffs' argument; a literal reading of the
statute undoubtedly accords more closely
with their position. As such, based solely on
the language and context of the most
relevant statutory provisions, the court
cannot say that Congress's intent is so clear
and unambiguous that it “foreclose[s] any
other interpretation.”

First, the defendants argue that reporting
provisions in § 36B(f) conflict with the
plaintiffs' interpretation and confirm that the
premium tax credits must be available on
federally-run Exchanges. Section 36B(f)—
titled “Reconciliation of credit and advance
credit”—requires the IRS to reduce the
amount of a taxpayer's end-of-year premium
tax credit by the amount of any advance
payment of such credit. To enable the IRS to
track these advance payments, the statute
requires “[e]ach Exchange (or any person
carrying out 1 or more responsibilities of an
Exchange under section 1311(f)(3) or
1321(c) of the [Act] )” to provide certain
information to the Department of the
Treasury. There is no dispute that the
reporting requirements apply regardless of
whether an Exchange was established by a
state or HHS. The Exchanges are required to
report the following information:
(A) The level of coverage described in
section 1302(d) of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act and the period
such coverage was in effect.
(B) The total premium for the coverage
without regard to the credit under this
section or cost-sharing reductions under
section 1402 of such Act.
(C) The aggregate amount of any
advance payment of such credit or
reductions under section 1412 of such
Act.

2.

(D) The name, address, and TIN of the
primary insured and the name and TIN
of each other individual obtaining
coverage under the policy.

We next examine two other, less directly
relevant provisions of the Act to see if they
shed any more light on Congress's intent.

(E) Any information provided to the
Exchange, including any change of
circumstances, necessary to determine
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eligibility for, and the amount of, such
credit.
(F) Information necessary to determine
whether a taxpayer has received excess
advance payments.
The defendants argue, sensibly, that if
premium tax credits were not available on
federally-run Exchanges, there would be no
reason to require such Exchanges to report
the information found in subsections (C),
(E), and (F). It is therefore possible to infer
from the reporting requirements that
Congress intended the tax credits to be
available on both state- and federallyfacilitated Exchanges. The plaintiffs
acknowledge that some of the reporting
requirements are extraneous for federallyrun Exchanges, but note that the other
categories of reportable information, i.e.,
subsections (A), (B), and (D), remain
relevant even in the absence of credits. The
plaintiffs suggest that Congress was simply
saving itself the trouble of writing two
separate subsections, one for each type of
Exchange,
by
including
a
single
comprehensive list.
The second source of potentially
irreconcilable language offered by the
defendants
concerns
the
“qualified
individuals” provision under ACA § 1312.
That section sets forth provisions regarding
which individuals may purchase insurance
from the Exchanges. It provides that only
“qualified individuals” may purchase health
plans in the individual markets offered
through the Exchanges, and explains that a
“qualified individual” is a person who
“resides in the State that established the
Exchange.” The defendants argue that unless
their reading of § 1321 is adopted and

understood to mean that the federal
government stands in the shoes of the state
for purposes of establishing an Exchange,
there would be no “qualified individuals”
existing in the thirty-four states with
federally-facilitated Exchanges because
none of those states is a “State that
established the Exchange.” This would leave
the federal Exchanges with no eligible
customers, a result Congress could not
possibly have intended.
The plaintiffs acknowledge that this would
be untenable, and suggest that the residency
requirement is only applicable to statecreated Exchanges. They note that § 1312
states that a “qualified individual”—“with
respect to an Exchange ”—is one who
“resides in the State that established the
Exchange.”
Accordingly,
because
“Exchange” is defined as an Exchange
established under § 1311,i.e., the provision
directing states to establish Exchanges, the
residency
requirement
only
limits
enrollment on state Exchanges.
Having considered the parties' competing
arguments on both of the above-referenced
sections, we remain unpersuaded by either
side. Again, while we think the defendants
make the better of the two cases, we are not
convinced that either of the purported
statutory conflicts render Congress's intent
clear. Both parties offer reasonable
arguments and counterarguments that make
discerning Congress's intent difficult.
Additionally, we note that the Supreme
Court has recently reiterated the admonition
that courts avoid revising ambiguously
drafted legislation out of an effort to avoid
“apparent anomal [ies]” within a statute. It is
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not especially surprising that in a bill of this
size—“10 titles stretch[ing] over 900 pages
and contain [ing] hundreds of provisions,”—
there would be one or more conflicting
provisions. Wary of granting excessive
analytical weight to relatively minor
conflicts within a statute of this size, we
decline to accept the defendants' arguments
as dispositive of Congress's intent.
3.
The Act's legislative history is also not
particularly illuminating on the issue of tax
credits. As both parties concede, the
legislative history of the Act is somewhat
lacking, particularly for a bill of this
size. Several floor statements from Senators
support the notion that it was well
understood that tax credits would be
available for low- and middle-income
Americans nationwide. For example,
Senator Baucus stated that the “tax credits
will help to ensure all Americans can afford
quality health insurance.” He later estimated
that “60 percent of those who are getting
insurance in the individual market on the
exchange will get tax credits....” … These
figures only make sense if all financially
eligible Americans are understood to have
access to the credits.
However, it is possible that such statements
were made under the assumption that every
state would in fact establish its own
Exchange. As the district court stated,
“Congress did not expect the states to turn
down federal funds and fail to create and run
their own Exchanges.” The statements
therefore do not necessarily address the
question of whether the credits would
remain available in the absence of state-

created Exchanges. The plaintiffs argue
extensively that Congress could not have
anticipated that so few states would establish
their own Exchanges. Indeed, they argue
that Congress attempted to “coerce” the
states into establishing Exchanges by
conditioning the availability of the credits on
the presence of state Exchanges. The
plaintiffs contend that Congress struck an
internal bargain in which it decided to favor
state-run Exchanges by incentivizing their
creation with billions of dollars of tax
credits. According to the plaintiffs, however,
Congress's plan backfired when a majority
of states refused to establish their own
Exchanges, in spite of the incentives. The
plaintiffs thus acknowledge that the lack of
widely available tax credits is counter to
Congress's original intentions, but consider
this the product of a Congressional
miscalculation that the courts have no
business correcting.
Although the plaintiffs offer no compelling
support in the legislative record for their
argument, it is at least plausible that
Congress would have wanted to ensure state
involvement in the creation and operation of
the Exchanges. Such an approach would
certainly comport with a literal reading of 26
U.S.C. § 36B's text. In any event, it is
certainly possible that the Senators quoted
above were speaking under the assumption
that each state would establish its own
Exchange, and that they could not have
envisioned the issue currently being
litigated. Although Congress included a
fallback provision in the event the states
failed to act, it is not clear from the
legislative record how large a role Congress
expected the federal Exchanges to play in
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administering the Act. We are thus of the
opinion that nothing in the legislative history
of the Act provides compelling support for
either side's position.
Having examined the plain language and
context of the most relevant statutory
sections, the context and structure of related
provisions, and the legislative history of the
Act, we are unable to say definitively that
Congress limited the premium tax credits to
individuals living in states with state-run
Exchanges. We note again that, on the
whole, the defendants have the better of the
statutory construction arguments, but that
they fail to carry the day. Simply put, the
statute is ambiguous and subject to at least
two different interpretations. As a result, we
are unable to resolve the case in either
party's favor at the first step of
the Chevron analysis.
B.
Finding that Congress has not “directly
spoken to the precise question at issue,” we
move to Chevron's second step. At step two,
we ask whether the “agency's [action] is
based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” We “will not usurp an agency's
interpretive authority by supplanting its
construction with our own, so long as the
interpretation is not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.’ A
construction meets this standard if it
‘represents a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to
the agency's care by the statute.’ ” We have
been clear that “[r]eview under this standard
is highly deferential, with a presumption in
favor of finding the agency action valid.”

…
What we must decide is whether the statute
permits the IRS to decide whether the tax
credits would be available on federal
Exchanges. In answering this question in the
affirmative we are primarily persuaded by
the IRS Rule's advancement of the broad
policy goals of the Act. There is no question
that the Act was intended as a major
overhaul of the nation's entire health
insurance market. The Supreme Court has
recognized the broad policy goals of the
Act: “to increase the number of Americans
covered by health insurance and decrease
the cost of health care.” Similarly, Title I of
the ACA is titled “Quality, Affordable
Health Care for All Americans”
Several provisions of the Act are necessary
to achieving these goals. To begin with, the
individual mandate requires nearly all
Americans to have health insurance or pay a
fine. Increasing the pool of insured
individuals has the intended side-effect of
increasing revenue for insurance providers.
The increased revenue, in turn, supports
several more specific policy goals contained
in the Act. The most prominent of these are
the guaranteed-issue and community-rating
provisions. In short, these provisions bar
insurers from denying coverage or charging
higher premiums because of an individual's
health status. However, these requirements,
standing alone, would result in an “adverse
selection” scenario whereby individuals
disproportionately likely to utilize health
care would drive up the costs of policies
available on the Exchanges.
Congress understood that one way to avoid
such price increases was to require near33

universal participation in the insurance
marketplace via the individual mandate. In
combination with the individual mandate,
Congress authorized broad incentives—
totaling hundreds of billions of dollars—to
further increase market participation among
low- and middle-income individuals. A
Congressional Budget Office report issued
while the Act was under consideration
informed Congress that there would be an
“an influx of enrollees with below-average
spending for health care, who would
purchase coverage because of the new
subsidies to be provided and the individual
mandate to be imposed.” The report further
advised Congress that “[t]he substantial
premium subsidies available in the
exchanges would encourage the enrollment
of a broad range of people”; and that the
structure of the premium tax credits, under
which federal subsidies increase if
premiums rise, “would dampen the chances
that a cycle of rising premiums and
declining enrollment would ensue.” As the
defendants further explain, denying tax
credits to individuals shopping on federal
Exchanges would throw a debilitating
wrench into the Act's internal economic
machinery:
Insurers in States with federally-run
Exchanges would still be required to
comply with guaranteed-issue and
community-rating rules, but, without
premium tax subsidies to encourage
broad participation, insurers would be
deprived of the broad policy-holder
base required to make those reforms
viable. Adverse selection would cause
premiums to rise, further discouraging
market participation, and the ultimate
result would be an adverse-selection
“death spiral” in the individual

insurance markets in States
federally-run Exchanges.

with

It is therefore clear that widely available tax
credits are essential to fulfilling the Act's
primary goals and that Congress was aware
of their importance when drafting the bill.
The IRS Rule advances this understanding
by ensuring that this essential component
exists on a sufficiently large scale. The IRS
Rule became all the more important once a
significant number of states indicated their
intent to forgo establishing Exchanges. With
only sixteen state-run Exchanges currently
in place, the economic framework
supporting the Act would crumble if the
credits were unavailable on federal
Exchanges. Furthermore, without an
exception to the individual mandate,
millions more Americans unable to purchase
insurance without the credits would be
forced to pay a penalty that Congress never
envisioned imposing on them. The IRS Rule
avoids both these unforeseen and
undesirable consequences and thereby
advances the true purpose and means of the
Act.
It is thus entirely sensible that the IRS would
enact the regulations it did, making Chevron
deference appropriate. Confronted with the
Act's ambiguity, the IRS crafted a rule
ensuring the credits' broad availability and
furthering the goals of the law. In the face of
this permissible construction, we must defer
to the IRS Rule.
Tellingly, the plaintiffs do not dispute that
the premium tax credits are an essential
component of the Act's viability. Instead, as
explained above, they concede that Congress
probably wanted to make subsidies available
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throughout the country, but argue that
Congress was equally concerned with
ensuring that the states play a leading role in
administering the Act, and thus conditioned
the availability of the credits on the creation
of state Exchanges. The plaintiffs argue that
the IRS Rule exceeds the agency's authority
because it irreconcilably conflicts with
Congress's goal of ensuring state leadership.
For the reasons explained above, however,
we are not persuaded by the plaintiffs'
“coercion” argument and do not consider it a
valid basis for circumscribing the agency's
authority to implement the Act in an
efficacious manner.

expressed in clear and unambiguous terms,”
the Supreme Court has never suggested that
this principle displaces Chevron deference,
and in fact has made it quite clear that it
does not.

The
plaintiffs
also
attempt
to
avert Chevron deference by arguing that
ACA §§ 1311 and 1321 are administered by
HHS and not the IRS, and that as a result the
IRS had no authority to enact its final rule.
However, the relevant statutory language is
found in 26 U.S.C. § 36B, which is part of
the Internal Revenue Code and subject to
interpretation by the IRS. Although the IRS
Rule adopts by cross-reference an HHS
definition of “Exchange,” the Act clearly
gives to the IRS authority to resolve
ambiguities in 26 U.S.C. § 38B. This clear
delegation of authority to the IRS relieves us
of any possible doubt regarding the
propriety of relying on one agency's
interpretation of a single piece of a jointlyadministered statute.

AFFIRMED

Finally, the plaintiffs contend that a rule of
statutory construction that requires tax
exemptions and credits to be construed
narrowly displaces Chevron deference in
this case. However, while the Supreme
Court has stated that tax credits “must be

Rejecting all of the plaintiffs' arguments as
to why Chevron deference is inappropriate
in this case, for the reasons explained above
we are satisfied that the IRS Rule is a
permissible construction of the statutory
language. We must therefore apply Chevron
deference and uphold the IRS Rule.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.

DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:
I am pleased to join in full the majority's
holding that the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (the Act) “permits” the
Internal Revenue Service to decide whether
premium tax credits should be available to
consumers who purchase health insurance
coverage on federally-run Exchanges. But I
am also persuaded that, even if one takes the
view that the Act is not ambiguous in the
manner and for the reasons described, the
necessary outcome of this case is precisely
the same. That is, I would hold that
Congress has mandated in the Act that the
IRS provide tax credits to all consumers
regardless of whether the Exchange on
which they purchased their health insurance
coverage is a creature of the state or the
federal
bureaucracy.
Accordingly,
at Chevron Step One, the IRS Rule making
the tax credits available to all consumers of
Exchange-purchased
health
insurance
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coverage is the correct interpretation of the
Act and is required as a matter of law.
Although the Act expressly contemplates
state-run Exchanges, Congress created a
contingency provision that permits the
federal government, via the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, to “establish
and operate such Exchange within the State
and ... take such actions as are necessary to
implement such other requirements.” This
contingency provision is triggered when a
state elects not to set up an Exchange, when
a state is delayed in setting up an Exchange,
or when a state Exchange fails to meet
certain
statutory
and
regulatory
requirements.
Enter the premium tax credits, essentially a
tax subsidy for the purchase of health
insurance. The amended tax code sets forth
the formula for calculating the amount of a
consumer's premium tax credit. In general,
the credit is equal to the lesser of two
amounts: the monthly premium for a
qualified health plan “enrolled in through an
Exchange established by the State,” or the
excess of the adjusted monthly premium for
a certain type of health plan over a
percentage of the taxpayer's household
income.
Appellants contend that the language
“enrolled
in
through
an
Exchange established by the State ”
precludes the IRS from providing premium
tax credits to consumers who purchase
health insurance coverage on federal
Exchanges. To them, “established by the
State” in the premium tax credits calculation
subprovision is the sine qua non of this case.
An Exchange established by the State is not

an Exchange established by the federal
government, they argue; thus, the equation
for calculating the amount of the premium
tax credit is wholly inapplicable to all
consumers who purchase health insurance
coverage on federally-run Exchanges.
I am not persuaded and for a simple reason:
“[E]stablished by the State” indeed means
established by the state-except when it does
not, i.e., except when a state has failed to
establish an Exchange and when the
Secretary, charged with acting pursuant to a
contingency for which Congress planned,
establishes and operates the Exchange in
place of the state. When a state elects not to
establish an Exchange, the contingency
provision authorizes federal officials to
establish and operate “such Exchange” and
to take any action adjunct to doing so.
That disposes of the Appellants' contention.
This is not a case that calls up the decadeslong
clashes
between
textualists,
purposivists, and other schools of statutory
interpretation. The case can be resolved
through a contextual reading of a few
different subsections of the statute. If there
were any remaining doubt over this
construction, the bill's structure dispels it:
The contingency provision at § 1321(c)(1) is
set forth in “Part III” of the bill, titled “State
Flexibility Relating to Exchanges,” a section
that appears after the section that creates the
Exchanges and mandates that they be
operated by state governments. What's more,
the contingency provision does not create
two-tiers of Exchanges; there is no
indication that Congress intended the
federally-operated Exchanges to be lesser
Exchanges and for consumers who utilize
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them to be less entitled to important
benefits. Thus, I conclude that a holistic
reading of the Act's text and proper attention
to its structure lead to only one sensible
conclusion: The premium tax credits must
be available to consumers who purchase
health insurance coverage through their
designated Exchange regardless of whether
the Exchange is state- or federally-operated.
The majority opinion understandably
engages with the Appellants and respectfully
posits they could be perceived to advance a
plausible construction of the Act, i.e., that
Congress may have sought to restrict the
scope of the contingency provision when it
used the phrase “established by the State” in
the premium tax credits calculation
subprovision. But as the majority opinion
deftly illustrates, a straightforward reading
of the Act strips away any and all possible
explanations for why Congress would have
intended to exclude consumers who
purchase health insurance coverage on
federally-run Exchanges from qualifying for
premium tax credits. Such a reading, the
majority opinion persuasively explains, is
not supported by the legislative history or by
the overall structure of the Act. Moreover,
the majority carefully and cogently explains
how “widely available tax credits are
essential to fulfilling the Act's primary goals
and [how] Congress was aware of their
importance when drafting the bill.” Thus,
the majority correctly holds that Congress
did not intend a reading that has no
legislative history to support it and runs
contrary to the Act's text, structure, and
goals. Appellants' “literal reading” of the
premium
tax
credits
calculation

subprovision
renders
the
Congressional scheme nonsensical.

entire

In fact, Appellants' reading is not literal; it's
cramped. No case stands for the proposition
that literal readings should take place in a
vacuum, acontextually, and untethered from
other parts of the operative text; indeed, the
case law indicates the opposite. So does
common sense: If I ask for pizza from Pizza
Hut for lunch but clarify that I would be fine
with a pizza from Domino's, and I then
specify that I want ham and pepperoni on
my pizza from Pizza Hut, my friend who
returns from Domino's with a ham and
pepperoni pizza has still complied with a
literal construction of my lunch order. That
is this case: Congress specified that
Exchanges should be established and run by
the states, but the contingency provision
permits federal officials to act in place of the
state when it fails to establish an Exchange.
The premium tax credit calculation
subprovision
later
specifies
certain
conditions regarding state-run Exchanges,
but that does not mean that a literal reading
of that provision somehow precludes its
applicability to substitute federally-run
Exchanges or erases the contingency
provision out of the statute.
That
Congress
sometimes
specified
state and federal Exchanges in the bill is as
unremarkable as it is unrevealing. This was,
after all, a 900–page bill that purported to
restructure the means of providing health
care in this country. Neither the canons of
construction nor any empirical analysis
suggests that congressional drafting is a
perfectly harmonious, symmetrical, and
elegant endeavor. Sausage-makers are
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indeed offended when their craft is linked to
legislating. At worst, the drafters' perceived
inconsistencies (if that is what they are at
all) are far less probative of Congress' intent
than the unqualified and broad contingency
provision.
Appellants insist that the use of “established
by the State” in the premium tax credits
calculation subprovision is evidence of
Congress' intent to limit the availability of
tax credits to consumers of state Exchangepurchased health insurance coverage. Their
reading bespeaks a deeply flawed effort to
squeeze the proverbial elephant into the
proverbial mousehole. If Congress wanted to
create a two-tiered Exchange system, it
would have done so expressly in the section
of the Act that authorizes the creation of
contingent, federally-run Exchanges. If
Congress wanted to limit the availability of
premium tax credits to consumers who
purchase health coverage on state-run
Exchanges, it would have said so rather than
tinkering with the formula in a subprovision
governing how to calculate the amount of
the credit.
The real danger in the Appellants' proposed
interpretation of the Act is that it misses the
forest for the trees by eliding Congress'
central purpose in enacting the Act: to
radically restructure the American health
care market with “the most expansive social
legislation enacted in decades.” The

widespread availability of premium tax
credits was intended as a critical part of the
bill, a point the President highlighted at the
bill signing. Appellants' approach would
effectively destroy the statute by
promulgating a new rule that makes
premium tax credits unavailable to
consumers who purchased health coverage
on federal Exchanges. But of course, as their
counsel largely conceded at oral argument,
that is their not so transparent purpose.
Appellants, citizens of the Commonwealth
of Virginia, do not wish to buy health
insurance. Most assuredly, they have the
right, but not the unfettered right, to decline
to do so. They have a clear choice, one
afforded by the admittedly less-than-perfect
representative process ordained by our
constitutional structure: they can either pay
the relatively minimal amounts needed to
obtain health care insurance as provided by
the Act, or they can refuse to pay and run
the risk of incurring a tiny tax penalty. What
they may not do is rely on our help to deny
to millions of Americans desperately-needed
health insurance through a tortured,
nonsensical construction of a federal statute
whose manifest purpose, as revealed by the
wholeness and coherence of its text and
structure, could not be more clear.
As elaborated in this separate opinion, I am
pleased to concur in full in Judge Gregory's
carefully reasoned opinion for the panel.
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“Lawyers Challenging Health Subsidies Seek Quick Supreme Court Ruling”
The LA Times
David G. Savage
July 31, 2014
Lawyers challenging President Obama's
healthcare law filed a quick appeal with the
Supreme Court on Thursday, urging justices
to take up the issue this fall and throw out
insurance subsidies for nearly 5 million
Americans.

lawyers take the full time. But in this
instance, the opponents of the Affordable
Care Act want the court's conservative
justices to have a chance to take up the new
healthcare case in a few months so they can
rule by next spring.

"The monumental significance of this legal
issue requires the court's immediate, urgent
attention," they said in a filing. "The longer
the lawless IRS rule is in effect, the greater
the upheaval when it is ultimately vacated."

The Obama administration has the opposite
strategy on timing. The Justice Department
said it planned to ask the full appeals court
in the District of Columbia to reconsider last
week's ruling by a three-judge panel. If so,
that could delay a final ruling from the
appeals court until next year and push off a
Supreme Court decision to 2016.

Last week, two federal appeals courts
handed down conflicting rulings on whether
the Obama administration may pay subsidies
to low-and middle-income Americans who
buy insurance on the federal "exchange"
created under the Affordable Care Act.
In one ruling from the District of Columbia,
an appeals court panel said these subsidies
are illegal in the 36 states that rely on an
exchange established by federal authorities.
The judges pointed to a part of the law that
says tax subsidies may be paid for insurance
purchased on an exchange "established by
the state."
But in a second ruling, an appeals court in
Virginia rejected this challenge and decided
Congress intended to offer subsidies
nationwide regardless of whether consumers
use a state or federal exchange.
Under the court's rules, lawyers who lose in
an appeals court have 90 days to seek a
review in the Supreme Court. And normally,

By then, millions of Americans will have
relied for several years on having health
insurance they could afford thanks to the
subsidies. A single adult with an income up
to $45,960 and a family of four with an
income up $94,200 may obtain insurance on
an exchange at a reduced cost.
The appeal filed Thursday is funded by the
libertarian Competitive Enterprise Institute.
Late last week, the group publicized a video
from 2012 in which a leading academic
advocate of the healthcare law says states
must establish insurance exchanges or lose
subsidies for its citizens.
Jonathan Gruber, an MIT economist who
advised Democrats on the healthcare law,
was asked at a conference whether the
federal government could run an exchange if
the states refused. Yes, Gruber said. "If the
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states don't provide them, the federal
backstop will. The federal government has
been sort of slow in putting out its backstop,
I think partly because they want to sort of
squeeze the states to do it. I think what's
important to remember politically about this
is, if you are a state and you don't set up an
exchange, that means your citizens don't get
their tax credits."

evidence that the sponsors of the law
intended to limit subsidies to those states
which established an exchange.
Defenders of the law have insisted that view
is absurd. They say the Democrats who
wrote the law intended that subsidies would
be offered to everyone who qualified and
that the federal exchanges were intended to
play the same role as the state exchanges.

In appealing to the Supreme Court, the
lawyers quote Gruber's statement as
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“Halbig, King Decisions Overturning Subsidies May Hinder ACA
Implementation”
Wolters Kluwer
August 4, 2014
The ultimate outcomes of Halbig v
Burwell and King v Burwell, remain to be
seen. However, the overturn of 26 USC Sec.
36B that may result is predicted to “broadly
undermine the implementation” of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA), according to a report by the Urban
Institute and the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation. Consequences of the possible
overturn of Sec. 36B, which provides
premium subsidies for plans on the federally
facilitated Marketplaces (FFMs), are likely
to include increases in premiums and
uninsured rates.
Recent decisions. In Halbig, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the IRS
regulation that provides for federal funding
for subsidies to aid in the purchase of health
insurance through the FFMs, stating, “[W]e
conclude that the ACA unambiguously
restricts the section 36B subsidy to
insurance
purchased
on
Exchanges
‘established by the State.’” Previous oral
arguments turned on whether the legislative
history showed intent to use premium tax
subsidies as an incentive for states to create
their own Exchanges. The D.C. Circuit had
been dubious of the government’s
arguments against such an interpretation of
the
legislative
intent—especially
considering that the words “established by
the state” appeared in the statute’s language
eight or nine times.

In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in King found
the ACA’s language—which the D.C.
Circuit purported to limit such tax credits to
state-run Exchanges—“ambiguous and
subject to multiple interpretations,” and gave
the IRS deference its application of tax
credits to FFMs.
Implications
in
coverage
and
subsidies. According to the report, which
was written before the release of
the King and Halbig decisions, nearly 12
million enrollments are expected in the 34
FFMs in 2016. Of those enrollments, an
estimated 7.3 million individuals will
receive federal subsidies to aid in the
purchase of health insurance through the
Marketplaces, and many are expected to pay
lower copayments, deductibles, and
coinsurance through cost-sharing subsidies.
If Sec. 36B is ultimately overturned, it
would “[translate] into a loss of $36.1 billion
in 2016 of funds that would otherwise go to
individuals and families with incomes below
400 percent of the federal poverty level.”
The effects of the overturn of Sec. 36B also
are predicted to cause spillover effects to
state economies, which will likely
experience a loss of federal funding,
according to the report. The study estimated
losses as high as $4.8 billion in Florida and
$5.6 billion in Texas. Twenty-four of the 34
states are already foregoing federal funding
in choosing not to expand Medicaid under
the ACA. The report suggests that the 34
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FFM states consider creating their own
state-based Marketplaces to avoid the
consequences of an overturn of Sec. 36B.
Effects
on
other
ACA
components. According to the report, the
elimination of the premium tax subsidies
“would have a domino effect on other
components of the ACA, as well.” Among

the effects predicted in the report is an
increase in the number of uninsured as a
result of unaffordable premium costs in the
absence of subsidies, resulting in an increase
of individual mandate penalties. The report
also suggests that the shrinking of the
insurance pool is likely to result in insurers
advocating for the repeal of antidiscrimination regulations.
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“After Health Law Rulings, Here are Possible Next Steps”
The New York Times (The Upshot)
Margot Sanger-Katz
July 22, 2014
We now have two federal appeals courts that
have issued conflicting rulings on a major
provision of the Affordable Care Act. Those
decisions are not the final word on whether
residents of some states will be able to
continue receiving financial assistance to
buy health insurance. Here are some
possible next steps:
All the judges on the D.C. Circuit could
decide the Halbig v. Burwell case. There is
a process called “en banc” review in which
the case would be reargued before all of the
11 judges on the D.C. Circuit Court, and the
Obama administration has said it will ask
the court for such a review. A majority of
the judges would have to agree to rehear the
case for it to be reconsidered in this way.
Appellate courts rarely accept cases for en
banc review, but this is a big one. Many
legal experts think that the full court would
view the government’s position more
favorably than the two judges who ruled
against them in the original decision on
Tuesday; legal questions don’t necessarily
break down along political lines, but
Democratic
appointees
outnumber
Republican appointees on the court and
include four new judges recently appointed
by President Obama.
The law’s challengers could ask the
Fourth Circuit to reconsider King v.
Burwell. Same rules apply, and the Fourth
Circuit also has more judges appointed by
Democrats than Republicans.

Decisions will be issued by other courts.
The plaintiffs in the Virginia and D.C. cases
are not the only ones challenging tax
subsidies in the Affordable Care Act. Two
trial court cases raise similar issues, one in
Oklahoma and one in Indiana. Those cases
could also go to appellate courts. Oklahoma
is in the 10th Circuit; Indiana is in the 7th.
Depending on the outcomes of the various
rulings, all courts could end up agreeing, or
there could remain a disagreement between
different circuits.
Either side—or both—could appeal the
rulings to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court can pick which case it wants
to hear; four judges must vote to take a case
for it to be added to the court’s schedule.
The Supreme Court generally rejects most
petitions for a hearing but tends to intervene
when circuit courts disagree about a
substantive issue of law. The current
disagreement between the D.C. and Fourth
Circuits is a good example of the type of
split that usually gets its attention.
The Supreme Court could decide the case.
In addition to deciding whether tax subsidies
can be used in states without their own
exchanges, the court would face another
question if it ruled in favor of the
challengers: What happens to the tax credits
that have already been handed out?
Congress could act. The legal question
came up because of ambiguities in the
drafting of the Affordable Care Act that
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made it unclear when tax subsidies should
apply. If it was so inclined—a big if, in this
polarized climate—Congress could fix the
language and clarify who is eligible for the
federal money.
States could act. Right now, 36 states are
relying on the federal government to run at
least parts of their insurance marketplaces,
meaning that their residents could lose

access to tax credits if the D.C. Circuit case
is upheld. But any of those states could
choose to switch to a state exchange, where
the law is clear that the tax credits do apply.
A few states are already working on
switching from federal to state exchanges.
Others might consider a similar shift, though
the change would be difficult and potentially
expensive.
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“Supreme Court Could Hear Obamacare Subsidy Feud”
CNBC Business
July 31, 2014
Let's get ready to rumble.
The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday was
asked to hear a case that is considered
perhaps the single biggest current threat to
Obamacare.
The case hinges on the question of whether
the federal government can give billions of
dollars in financial aid to people who buy
Obamacare insurance on HealthCare.gov.
The request to fast-track a final decision on
that issue comes a week after judicial panels
in separate federal appeals circuits issued
conflicting rulings on the legality of such
subsidies for enrollees on that federally run
Obamacare exchange. Financial aid given
customers of state-run marketplaces is not
being challenged.
If the Supreme Court takes the case, and
ultimately rules for the plaintiffs, it would
render illegal tax credits that helped nearly 5
million
people
buy
insurance
on
HealthCare.gov, which sells health plans
insurance in 36 states.
For now, those subsidies, which go to 86
percent of federal exchange customers,
remain legal.
If the high court said the HealthCare.gov
subsidies were illegal, it also would destroy
or cripple in those affected states two major
Obamacare mandates, which impose fines if
certain employers don't offer health
insurance to workers, and if individuals
don't obtain health coverage.

The Competitive Enterprise Institute, the
group that has backed several court
challenges to the Obamacare subsidies,
announced the petition had been filed.
For the Supreme Court to take the case, it
would require at least four justices to agree
to hear it. If the court takes the case, it could
be heard after it opens its next term in
October, and decided by next May.
"From the time these case were first filed,
we've tried to get this issue resolved as
quickly as possible for the plaintiffs and the
millions of individual like them," said CEI
general counsel Sam Kazman.
"A fast resolution is also vitally important to
the states that chose not to set up exchanges,
to the employers in those states who face
either major compliance costs or huge
penalties, and to employees who face
possible layoffs or reductions in their work
hours as a result of this illegal IRS rule,"
Kazman said
"Our petition today to the Supreme Court
represents the next step in that process."
Kazman noted that two days after last
week's split rulings, a 2012 video surfaced
of MIT economist Jonathan Gruber, one of
the architects of Obamacare, saying that
residents of states that did not establish their
own Obamacare exchanges would not be
eligible for subsidies.
"If you're a state and you don't set up an
exchange, that means your citizens don't get
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their tax credits. … I hope that's a blatant
enough political reality that states will get
their act together and realize there are
billions of dollars at stake here in setting up
these exchanges, and that they'll do
it," Gruber told his audience on the video.
CEI, in a press release, said Gruber's
comment :contradicts the current claim by
the government: that Congress never
intended to withhold subsidies." The petition
asking the Supreme Court to take up the
case cites Gruber's remarks.
Timothy Jost, a law professor who argues
that the subsidies are legal regardless of
what kind of government exchange they're
issued through, said, "This is an act of
desperation to keep a case alive which was
always an act of desperation by advocates
who have been unable in succeed in
Congress."
But Michael Cannon, director of health
studies at the Cato Institute and one of the
intellectual godfathers of the challenge to
the subsidies, said it was "the right decision"
to ask the Supreme Court to settle the issue
once and for all.
"There are tens of millions of individuals
and a quarter-million businesses, dozens of
insurance companies and three dozen states
that need to have this issue resolved and
resolved quickly," Cannon said. "It's not a
small issue."
"Even if all those people's economic
decisions were" not at issue, he said.
"There's a question of whether the president
of the United State is borrowing, and
spending and taxing tens of billions of
dollars
without
Congressional

authorization," Cannon said. He said there
are "probably" enough votes on the court to
grant the petition to be heard.
The Supreme Court is being asked to reverse
3-0 ruling by a panel of judges in the Fourth
Circuit federal appeals court last week that
upheld the legality of financial aid given to
enrollees on a federally-run Obamacare
exchange. That case is known as King v.
Burwell.
Another federal appeals court panel sitting
in Washington, D.C., in a bombshell, 2-1,
decision, ruled those subsidies are illegal
because they were issued to enrollees on the
federal exchange HealthCare.gov. In that
case, known as Halbig v. Burwell, the
Obama administration intends to seek a
reversal of the decision by a so-called en
banc panel made up f all judges in the D.C.
appeals circuit.
A senior Obama administration official,
speaking on the condition of anonymity,
said, "We think that the Fourth Circuit's
unanimous panel made the right decision,
agreeing with Congress and common sense."
"As we have previously said, the
government is following the normal process
and seeking a full review of 2-1 decision in
the Halbig case. If the en banc D.C. Circuit
rules in favor of the government, there will
be no split in the courts of appeals and no
need for Supreme Court review."
"This litigation should be seen for what it is
– another partisan attempt to undermine the
Affordable Care Act," the senior official
said.
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The Obama administration survived a
challenge to Obamacare at the Supreme
Court, when a majority that surprisingly
included conservative Chief Justice John
Roberts upheld most elements of the
Affordable Care Act, including the mandate
that most Americans obtain health insurance
or pay a tax penalty.

About 2 million people receiving such
financial aid this year.

But neither the administration nor supporters
of Obamacare relish having the high court
take up the question of subsidies,
particularly after a recent Supreme Court
ruling that went against the administration in
an Obamacare case.

The administration is considered to have the
edge in such a so-called "en banc" review by
the full appeals court because judges
appointed by Democratic presidents hold a
7-4 edge over Republican appointees in that
circuit.

In that case, known as Hobby Lobby, the
high court said that certain companies could
claim a religious exemption to the mandate
that their health plans covers contraception
without requiring employees to pay out-ofpocket costs.

Last fall, US Senate Majority Harry Reid,
D-Nev., changed Senate rules to remove the
ability of senators to use a filibuster to
prevent judicial nominations below the
Supreme Court. Reid's move set in motion
the seating of three judges appointed by
President Obama to the D.C. appeals circuit
— who are part of that three-vote margin in
the administration's favor on the court now.

Plaintiffs in both subsidy-related cases claim
the Affordable Care Act as written only
allows financial aid to be given to customers
of state-run Obamacare marketplaces. The
ACA, in fact, explicitly only mentions such
aid in the context of it being given to staterun exchange enrollees.
The Obama administration, and Obamacare
advocates, in turn argue that is a too-narrow
reading of the statute, and that it ignores
what they say was Congress' obvious
intention to make financial aid available to
all qualified individuals, regardless of where
they purchased insurance.
Subsidies issued to people who buy
Obamacare plans on one of 15 exchanges
run by individual states and the District of
Columbia are not threatened by the cases.

There is no right to have a case heard by the
Supreme Court. It will be up to the justices
on the court whether to take the case.
It is possible they will let the issue be sorted
out first by the lower federal appeals courts.

If the administration won an en banc review
in the D.C. circuit, then there would be no
split with the Fourth Circuit in their view of
the subsidies' legality. That, in turn, would
make it less likely for the Supreme Court to
consider an appeal by the plaintiffs.
Jost, the Washington and Lee University
School of Law professor who has been a key
player in the debate over the subsidies, said,
"The Justice Department has already said
that it will file for en banc review with the
full D.C.circuit."
Once that happens, it is likely that [D.C.
Circuit judge Thomas]Griffith's obviously
political decision will be set aside. In the
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absence of a division between the D.C.
Circuit and Fourth Circuit, it is very unlikely
the Supreme Court will take the case, unless
it is willing to make an overtly politically
partisan move," Jost said.
There are two other similar cases pending in
federal courts in Indiana and Oklahoma, but
neither has reached the appellate level.
The Wall Street Journal editorial page last
week urged Michael Carvin, the lawyer who
has been representing the plaintiffs in both
pending appeals, to skip asking the Fourth
Circuit for an en banc review of its decision,
and instead to petition the Supreme Court to
hear the case, and resolve the issue once and
for all.
Carvin's chances with an en banc review at
the Fourth Circuit are not rated very high by
people on both sides of the argument.
Obamacare supporters have long scoffed at
the claims of the plaintiffs, but they have
readily conceded the fact that if the plaintiffs
prevailed it would be a dire threat to the
goals of the Affordable Care Act.
If the Supreme Court ruled for the plaintiffs,
it would prevent billions of dollars worth of
taxpayer funded subsidies from being given
to help people buy insurance on a federallyrun exchange.

Such a ruling also would destroy in those
HealthCare.gov-served states a looming
Obamacare rule that will require most midand large-sized employers to offer
affordable health coverage to workers or pay
a fine.
That's because those fines only take effect if
a worker at such a company buys a plan
from an Obamacare exchange with financial
aid from the government.
And, such a ruling also would effectively
cripple, again in those states, another
Obamacare rule that compels individuals to
have some form of health coverage or pay a
tax penalty. Without subsidies, insurance
sold on HealthCare.gov would be considered
unaffordable for many people under the
rules of Obamacare, and they would be
exempt from the penalty for not having
insurance.
If the Supreme Court invalidated the
HealthCare.gov subsidies, states currently
served by that exchange would be free — as
they are now — to set up their own
exchanges that would sell subsidized
coverage to their residents.
While some states might do so, many others,
led by Republican governors and
Republican-controlled legislatures, would be
unlikely to set up an exchange because it
would be seen as endorsing Obamacare.
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“By Any Means Necessary”
New York Times
Linda Greenhouse
August 20, 2014
The Affordable Care Act — Obamacare —
has endured so many near-death experiences
that digging into the details of still another
effort to demolish it is admittedly not an
inviting prospect. (My own reaction, I
confess, to hearing some months back about
the latest legal challenge — this one aimed
at the supposed effect of a single word in the
900-page statute — was something along the
lines of “wake me when it’s over.”)
But stay with me, because this latest round,
catapulted onto the Supreme Court’s docket
earlier this month by the same forces that
brought us the failed Commerce Clause
attack two years ago, opens a window on
raw judicial politics so extreme that the saga
so far would be funny if the potential
consequences weren’t so serious.
To be clear, I’m not suggesting that there is
anything wrong with turning to the courts to
achieve what politics won’t deliver; we all
know that litigation is politics by other
means. (Think school desegregation. Think
reproductive rights. Think, perhaps, samesex marriage.) Nor is the creativity and
determination of the Affordable Care Act’s
opponents any great revelation — not after
they came within a hairsbreadth of getting
the law’s individual mandate thrown out on
a constitutional theory that would have been
laughed out of court not too many years ago.
Boy, are they ever determined. Flash back to
December 2010, when the Commerce

Clause challenges to the new law were
beginning to fill the legal pipeline en route
to the Supreme Court. At a conference held
at the American Enterprise Institute, a
conservative research organization in
Washington, Michael S. Greve, an A.E.I.
scholar and chairman of the Competitive
Enterprise Institute, had this to say in
reference to the Affordable Care Act:
“This bastard has to be killed as a
matter of political hygiene. I do not care
how this is done, whether it’s
dismembered, whether we drive a stake
through its heart, whether we tar and
feather it and drive it out of town,
whether we strangle it. I don’t care who
does it, whether it’s some court some
place, or the United States Congress.
Any which way, any dollar spent on
that goal is worth spending, any brief
filed toward that end is worth filing, any
speech or panel contribution toward that
end is of service to the United States.”
Mr. Greve went on to urge a litigating
strategy that looked beyond the mandate
to “concentrate on bits and pieces of
this law.”
And that’s exactly what his Competitive
Enterprise Institute proceeded to do. It is
financing a set of lawsuits with a seemingly
modest
ambition:
seeking
not
a
constitutional ruling but a mere statutory
interpretation. The suits put forward an
interpretation of the statutory language that
would deny tax credits to people who buy
insurance on the exchanges set up by the
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federal government in the 36 states that have
refused to establish their own exchanges. If
the Supreme Court buys that statutory
argument, a core goal of the Affordable Care
Act — facilitating the purchase of insurance
by people of modest income — would be
undermined to the point of collapse. Modest
indeed.
(The video from the American Enterprise
Institute conference has been making its way
around the internet; Mr. Greve’s comments
are just past the one hour, 30 minute mark. I
first saw it on the website of
the Constitutional Accountability Center, a
progressive Washington-based think tank
and legal shop.)
It was at the American Enterprise Institute
conference that the statutory argument first
came to light, in a Power Point presentation
by a lawyer from Greenville, S.C., Thomas
M. Christina, who specializes in employee
benefits. He said he had essentially stumbled
on the reference in Section 36B of the act
that refers to the availability of tax credits to
offset the cost of insurance plans “enrolled
in through an exchange established by the
state.” His conclusion was that the tax
credits — the federal subsidy that makes the
system work — were not available in what
he called the “non-capitulating states,” those
that refused to set up exchanges and, as
another section of the law permitted them to
do, left the job to the federal Department of
Health and Human Services.
I know and like Michael Greve, who is now
a law professor at George Mason University;
the rhetorical excess he exhibited at that
conference is part of his charm. And of

course, the motivations of those who
“cobbled the cases together,” in Mr. Greve’s
description in a recent blog post, say nothing
about the merits of their argument.
Nonetheless, as origin stories go, this makes
for a good one.
As to the merits, six federal appellate judges
have evaluated the statutory argument, and
four have rejected it. One judge, Harry T.
Edwards of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
called the case “specious,” a “not-so-veiled
attempt to gut” the law in defiance of “the
will of Congress.”
The problem is that Judge Edwards’s totally
persuasive opinion was written in dissent.
The majority opinion, concluding that the
Internal Revenue Service is without
statutory authority to issue tax credits for
insurance purchased on the federally
established exchanges where more than five
million people have bought their health
insurance, was written by Judge Thomas B.
Griffith and joined by Judge A. Raymond
Randolph.
Judge Griffith is a thoughtful judge who
spent five years as the Senate’s legal
counsel; sadly, whatever he learned in that
job about the legislative process was not on
display in this opinion, Halbig v. Burwell.
(Of course there are ambiguities and
inconsistencies in a 900-page bill that never
went to a conference committee for a final
stitching together of its many provisions.)
Judge Randolph is one of the most
outspoken and agenda-driven conservatives
on the entire federal bench. In a speech to
the far-right Heritage Foundation in 2010,
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for example, he denounced the Supreme
Court for having granted habeas corpus
rights to the Guantánamo detainees and
compared the justices to Tom and Daisy
Buchanan in “The Great Gatsby,” “careless
people who smashed things up” and “let
other people clean up the mess they made.”
He then proceeded in a series of opinions on
the appeals court to shrink the detainees’
habeas right to the vanishing point that it
eventually reached.
The decision joined by the two judges
trained a laser focus on a single section,
indeed on a single word, in the massive
statute: the reference to “an exchange
established by the state.” The opinion not
only ignored the broader context, in which
Congress clearly intended to make insurance
affordable so that as many healthy people as
possible would join an economically viable
pool, but also rejected the government’s
argument that language in other sections of
the law supported the view that Congress
didn’t mean to treat the state and federal
exchanges differently.
Section 1321(c) provides that if a state fails
to establish an exchange, the secretary of
Health and Human Services shall “establish
and operate such Exchange within the state
and the Secretary shall take such actions as
are necessary to implement such other
requirements.” The words “such Exchange,”
the government argues, mean that the
federal government stands in the state’s
shoes when it complies with this instruction;
for these purposes, the federal government is
the state.

That interpretation “makes sense,” all three
members of a three-judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, Va., concluded
in King v. Burwell, a decision that, by an
amazing coincidence of timing, was issued
the same day, July 22, as the contrary D.C.
Circuit opinion. Those three judges, Roger
L. Gregory, Stephanie D. Thacker and
Andre M. Davis, examined the statute as a
whole, in light of its purpose, and at the end
of the day found the federal-state issue to be
ambiguous. That’s all they needed to find
for the government to win the case.
To avoid the Chevron rule, the D.C. Circuit
majority had to find that the statute was
clear in ruling out tax credits on the federal
exchanges. The majority even shed a few
crocodile tears: “We reach this conclusion,
frankly, with reluctance.” The conclusion is
simply wrong. The Supreme Court has a
clear rule on what courts should do about
agency regulations adopted in the face of
statutory ambiguity: as long as the agency’s
action is based on a permissible
interpretation of the statute, courts must
defer to the agency. The situation is so
common that the 30-year-old decision
establishing the deference rule, Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council is one
of the most frequently cited of all Supreme
Court decisions.
In fact, one judge on the Fourth Circuit
panel, Andre M. Davis, wrote a separate
concurring opinion to say that the statute
was completely clear in the other direction.
The plaintiffs’ argument, he said, was based
on “a tortured, nonsensical construction of a
federal statute whose manifest purpose, as
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revealed by the wholeness and coherence of
its text and structure, could not be more
clear.”
With the two contrary decisions having
come down on the same day, the judicial
politics surrounding the fate of the
Affordable Care Act immediately got rich.
The
Obama
administration
quickly
announced its intention to seek rehearing by
the entire 11-member D.C. Circuit; it filed
its rehearing petition on August 1. Michael
A. Carvin, the lawyer for the law’s
opponents (he argued the two cases) might
have made the same request to the Fourth
Circuit. But he did the opposite: he appealed
to the Supreme Court, taking only two
weeks to file his petition instead of the
allotted 90 days. The race was on.
What, exactly, is the race? Clearly, the law’s
opponents have their best chance — indeed,
probably their only chance — in the
Supreme Court. They not only lost in the
Fourth Circuit, but they are likely to lose in
the D.C. Circuit as well if that court, its
membership recently bolstered by four
Obama appointees, grants rehearing. And
conversely, the administration has a clearer
path to victory before the entire appeals
court than it does in the Supreme Court. So
the opponents’ challenge is to persuade the
justices to take the case as quickly as
possible. And the best way to do that is to
keep the D.C. Circuit panel’s opinion on the
books.
Why? Because the one reliable marker of a
case the justices deem worthy of their
attention is a conflict in the federal circuits
on an important legal issue. But a decision

by the D.C. Circuit’s judges to grant
rehearing automatically wipes the panel
opinion off the books, even before the
rehearing itself takes place. With the panel
opinion vacated, there would be no conflict
— only a single ruling, a government win in
the Fourth Circuit, not (if neutral principles
govern, as of course they may not) a
particularly attractive case for Supreme
Court review.
So the opponents’ effort is trained on
persuading the D.C. Circuit not to grant
rehearing or — if that effort fails — to
delegitimize a grant of rehearing in the eyes
of friendly Supreme Court justices. The
conservative blogosphere has been buzzing
with messages to the appeals court, bank
shots intended to be read by the justices, or
at least their law clerks. Carrie Severino, a
former clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas
who blogs for National Review, wrote
earlier this month that “clearly this type of
case is exactly what the President had in
mind when he made his court-packing blitz
last year.” Would the new judges be “willing
to take the fall for the president in this case,”
she wondered: “Now those judges will have
to decide whether they want their first highprofile act on the court to be one that is
baldly political: overturning a meticulously
reasoned decision that overturned the IRS’s
attempt to rewrite the Affordable Care Act.
It would make the new judges look like
presidential pawns who are attempting to
save his bacon, lowering them to the level of
the disgraced and politicized IRS itself.”
The Volokh Conspiracy blog on The
Washington Post carried a somewhat more
politely worded imprecation to the D.C.
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Circuit by Jonathan H. Adler, a law
professor at Case Western Reserve
University and an architect of the statutory
strategy. So did the Wall Street Journal’s op
ed page. All these and others appeared
within a day of one another. It’s safe to say
that never has so much (virtual) ink been
spilled in public over the question of
whether a federal appeals court should grant
a rehearing petition. And for this politically
driven crowd to claim the moral high ground
in pre-emptively accusing others of playing
politics borders on fantasy.
As I said at the beginning of this column, it
would be funny if it wasn’t so serious.
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